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"SIT DOWN AND COUNT THE COST":
A FRAMEWORK FOR CONSTITUTIONALLY
ENFORCING THE 501(C)(3) CAMPAIGN
INTERVENTION BAN
Benjamin M. Leff
ABSTRACT
Section 501(c)(3) of the Internal Revenue Code (Code) prohibits
charities from intervening in a political campaign for or against a
candidate for public office. The Internal Revenue Service (Service)
currently interprets the campaign-intervention ban to absolutely prevent
charities from communicating their views on candidates, even if such
communications are completely financed by non-501 (c) (3) affiliates.
This article argues that the current Service enforcement paradigm is
unconstitutional because it exceeds the government interest in
preventing tax-deductible donations to be used for campaign-
intervention. A constitutional interpretation exists under the current
statutory framework, but it would require the Service to shift its focus
exclusively to campaign-intervention-related expenditures. The Service
could compel 501(c) (3) organizations to make all expenditures through
a non-501(c)(3) affiliate using funds that were raised on a non-
deductible basis, or receive reimbursement from a non-501 (c) (3) for all
such expenditures.
Enforcement of the ban under the proposed "expenditure"
paradigm requires an ability to "value" campaign-intervention speech
to provide a means for a non-501(c)(3) affiliate to pay for or reimburse
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the cost of such speech. This article evaluates competing valuation
theories, and finds that campaign-intervention speech that
communicates a charity's endorsement of a candidate (whether official
or unofficial) may "cost" more than commentators have previously
considered. Because an endorsement implicates the "goodwill" that an
organization has built up using tax-deductible contributions, it may well
be appropriate to take the cost of developing that goodwill into account
in determining the cost of the campaign-intervention communication.
This article proposes some guidelines for valuing the speech of
charities, taking the cost of goodwill into account. It concludes that an
"expenditure" paradigm that adequately valued the speech of charities
may be more enforceable, and therefore more effective at limiting
excessive or abusive campaign-intervention speech by charities, while
staying within constitutional parameters.
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I. INTRODUCTION
The Internal Revenue Code (Code) provides benefits to
charitable organizations, but it also imposes burdens.1 One such
burden is that a section 501(c)(3) organization may not "participate in,
or intervene in (including the publishing or distributing of
statements), any political campaign on behalf of (or in opposition to)
any candidate for public office" (hereinafter the Campaign
Intervention Ban or Ban).2
The Campaign Intervention Ban has been the subject of
considerable attention from both critics and supporters over its fifty-
. 3
odd-year history. When the overheated rhetoric is pared away, it
I In general, I have used the terms "charity," "charitable organization," and
"501(c)(3) organization" interchangeably to mean an organization that is described in
section 501(c)(3) of the Internal Revenue Code of 1986, as amended (Code), and
therefore potentially or actually exempt from tax under section 501(a) and authorized
to receive tax-deductible contributions under section 170(c)(3) of the Code.
2 I.R.C. § 501(c)(3). See also, I.R.C. § 170(c)(2)(D); Treas. Reg. § 1.501(c)(3)-
1(c)(3)(iii) (2008). The subject of this article is the Campaign Intervention Ban, which
generally prohibits charities from attempting to affect the outcome of an election.
Attempts by charities to affect the passage of legislation (commonly called
"lobbying") are separately restricted under section 501(c)(3), but the lobbying
restriction should not be confused with the Campaign Intervention Ban.
3 See infra notes 8-9 and accompanying text discussing critics and proponents of
the Ban. As of the writing of this article, the most recent attack on the ban has been a
day of protest called "Pulpit Freedom Day," in which thirty-three pastors openly
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becomes clear that the most coherent understanding of the Ban is that
it attempts to balance two competing governmental interests. On the
one hand, the provision reflects the government's interest in avoiding
the creation of a loophole in the funding of political campaigns. Since
501(c)(3) organizations receive contributions on a tax-deductible basis
- the argument goes - the ability to make use of such contributions
to influence the outcome of an election would constitute an unfair
advantage in favor of charities (or their donors) over other taxpayers.
The Ban, then, is often thought of as an attempt by Congress to
prevent a government "subsidy" from being used for partisan political4
purposes. In this article, I call this governmental interest
"expenditure equity," because it reflects the government's interest in
treating all taxpayers alike when they seek to use their funds to
influence the outcome of an election.5
On the other hand, the First Amendment of the U.S.
Constitution, and the jurisprudence developed to interpret it, reflects
an interest in ensuring certain speech rights, including the rights of
organizations to express their opinions about a candidate's
qualifications for office. If the Ban is interpreted in such a way as to
place unjustified or excessive burdens on an organization that wishes
to engage in protected speech, then such an interpretation conflicts
6with these free speech values enshrined in the First Amendment. The
Internal Revenue Service's (Service's) current regulatory paradigm
holds that if an activity communicates an opinion about a candidate
defied the Ban by endorsing presidential candidates from the pulpit. See, e.g., Laurie
Goodstein, Ministers to Defy I.R.S. by Endorsing Candidates, N.Y. TIMES, Sept. 26,
2008, at A20.
4 See Regan v. Taxation With Representation of Washington, 461 U.S. 540, 544
(1983). See also Anne Berrill Carroll, Religion, Politics and the IRS: Defining the
Limits of Tax Law Controls on Political Expression by Churches, 76 MARQ. L. REV.
217, 251 (1992), who notes that refusing to permit a governmental subsidy to be used
for partisan political purposes dates back at least as far as Slee v. Commissioner, 42
F.2d 184, 185 (2d Cir. 1930), in which Judge Learned Hand stated that
"[c]ontroversies of [a partisan political] sort must be conducted without public
subvention; the Treasury stands aside from them."
5 The fact that expenditure equity is the only coherent justification of the Ban is
not to say that it was necessarily the purpose that motivated Congress as a matter of
history. For a historical discussion of the enactment of the Ban see Oliver A. Houck,
On the Limits of Charity: Lobbying, Litigation, and Electoral Politics by Charitable
Organizations Under the Internal Revenue Code and Related Laws, 69 BROOK. L.
REV. 1, 16-29 (2003); Patrick L. O'Daniel, More Honored in the Breach: A Historical
Perspective of the Permeable IRS Prohibition on Campaigning by Churches, 42 B.C. L.
REV. 733 (2001).
6 See discussion infra Part III.
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that can be attributed to a 501(c)(3) organization, then that activity is
prohibited by the Ban.' The only option provided to 501(c)(3)
organizations that want to communicate their own views on the
qualifications of candidates is to give up their filing status and forfeit
their right to receive tax-deductible contributions for any purpose.
This article argues in Parts III and IV that the Service's current
interpretation of the Ban likely exceeds permissible constitutional
bounds.
Some commentators argue that the Service should continue (or
8begin) vigorous enforcement of the Ban. Others have proposed
solutions to resolve the existing clash between constitutional concerns
and the government's interest in expenditure equity, usually
proposing some limited exemption for certain types of
7 The Treasury has defined the activities prohibited to include, "the making of
oral statements on behalf of or in opposition to such a candidate." Treas. Reg. §
1.501(c)(3)-1(c)(3)(iii) (2008). An Internal Revenue Service (Service) representative
has amplified this interpretation as follows: "public statements of position (verbal or
written) made by or on behalf of the organization in favor of or in opposition to any
candidate for public office violate the prohibition against political campaign
intervention." Hearing on Review of Internal Revenue Code Section 501(c)(3)
Requirements for Religious Organizations Before the S. Comm. on Oversight of the H.
Comm. on Ways and Means, 107th Cong. (May 14, 2002) (testimony of Steven T.
Miller, Dir., Exempt Orgs., I.R.S.) [hereinafter Miller, Hearings]; see also, Rev. Rul.
2007-41, 2007-1 C.B. 1421, discussed infra at notes 73-82 and accompanying text.
While the Service absolutely prohibits communications that reflect a charity's own
views about a candidate, Service guidance attempts to create the opportunity for
individuals associated with charities to make known their personal views on
candidates and for organizations affiliated with charities to make known their views
on candidates (so long as they are sufficiently independent of the charity).
8 See Donald B. Tobin, Political Campaigning by Churches and Charities:
Hazardous for 501 (c)(3)s, Dangerous for Democracy, 95 GEO. L.J. 1313, 1317 (2007)
(arguing that permitting churches to engage in campaign intervention "would have
grave consequences for our democratic system of governance"); see also Benjamin S.
De Leon, Rendering a Taxing New Tide on IRC 501(c)(3): The Constitutional
Implications of H.R. 2357 and Alternatives for Increased Political Freedom in Houses
of Worship, 23 REV. LITIG. 691, 694 (2004) ("the imposition of the political activity
prohibition should remain as it currently is written in the Internal Revenue Code");
Vaughn E. James, Reaping Where They Have Not Sowed: Have American Churches
Failed to Satisfy the Requirements for the Religious Tax Exemption?, 43 CATH. LAW.
29, 78 (2004) (arguing that "[w]hat the country needs [is] strict enforcement by the
Service of the existing laws"); Ann M. Murphy, Campaign Signs and the Collection
Plate - Never the Twain Shall Meet?, 1 Prrr. TAX REV. 35, 37 (2003) (arguing that "it
is inadvisable and dangerous to allow churches and other houses of worship to
campaign for candidates and participate in politics").
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communications for certain 501(c)(3) organizations These proposals
often apply only to churches.' ° Legislation has been proposed. But
9 See Erik J. Ablin, The Price of Not Rendering to Caesar: Restrictions on
Church Participation in Political Campaigns, 13 NOTRE DAME J.L. ETHICS & PUB.
POL'Y 541, 559 (1999); Johnny Rex Buckles, Is the Ban on Participation in Political
Campaigns By Charities Essential to Their Vitality and Democracy? A Reply to
Professor Tobin, 42 U. RICH. L. REV. 1057 (2008) [hereinafter Buckles, Reply];
Johnny Rex Buckles, Not Even a Peep? The Regulation of Political Campaign Activity
By Charities Through Federal Tax Law, 75 U. CIN. L. REV. 1071, 1098 (2007)
[hereinafter Buckles, Peep] ("the charitable sector has a legitimate political voice that
federal income tax law should not substantially silence"); Laura Brown Chisolm,
Politics and Charity: A Proposal for Peaceful Coexistence, 58 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 308
(1990) (proposing that the Ban be limited to so-called "express advocacy"
communications under campaign finance law); Alan L. Feld, Rendering Unto Caesar
or Electioneering for Caesar? Loss of Church Tax Exemption for Participation in
Electoral Politics, 42 B.C. L. REV. 931, 939 (2001) ("[l]iteral enforcement of the
provision seems unpalatable"); Vaughn E. James, The African American Church,
Political Activity, and Tax Exemption, 37 SETON HALL L. REV. 371, 410 (2007)
(proposing that small churches be permitted to engage in campaign intervention using
funds raised for that purpose, so long as they refrain from endorsing candidates from
the pulpit or permitting candidates to campaign from the pulpit); Chris Kemmitt,
RFRA, Churches and the IRS: Reconsidering the Legal Boundaries of Church Activity
in the Political Sphere, 43 HARV. J. ON LEGIS. 145, 179 (2006) (proposing that churches
be permitted to engage in campaign intervention speech, so long as no "tax-exempt
money" is spent on it); Joseph S. Klapach, Thou Shalt Not Politic: A Principled
Approach to Section 501(c)(3)'s Prohibition on Political Campaign Activity, 84
CORNELL L. REV. 504, 540 (1999) (arguing that the Ban should not apply to any
501(c)(3) organization "when activity is peripheral to the furtherance of the
organization's legitimate exempt function"); Allan J. Samansky, Tax Consequences
When Churches Participate in Political Campaigns, 5 GEO. J.L. & PUB. POL'Y 145, 150
(2007); ("Involvement by churches in campaigns should be an effective counterweight
to moneyed interests that try to influence the voting public"); Jennifer M. Smith,
Morse Code, Da Vinci Code, Tax Code and... Churches: An Historical and
Constitutional Analysis of Why Section 501(c) (3) Does Not Apply to Churches, 23 J.L.
& POL. 41, 43 (2007) (arguing that churches should be completely exempt from the
Ban); Mark Totten, The Politics of Faith: Rethinking the Prohibition on Political
Campaign Intervention, 18 STAN. L. & POL'Y REV. 298, 314-15, 321 (2007) (proposing
that because of the unique character of faith, Congress should amend the Code to
permit oral communications at church gatherings); Deborah J. Zimmerman, Branch
Ministries, Inc. v. Rossotti: First Amendment Considerations to Loss of Tax
Exemption, 30 N. KY. L. REV. 249, 269-73 (2003) (describing various proposed
solutions).
10 1 attempt to use the term "church" in this article in generally the same way it
is used in the Code, to encompass any entity organized and operated for worship and
religious observance, and not just houses of Christian worship. See, e.g., I.R.C.
§170(b)(1)(A)(i). The definition of "church" for the purposes of the Code is a
complicated matter, see Samansky, supra note 9, at n.1, but these definitional issues
do not affect the discussion here.
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there is something of a "ships passing in the night" quality to this
debate. Proponents of the Ban champion enforcement in order to
avoid government subsidization of campaign intervention by
charities.12 They argue that the government's interest in expenditure
equity justifies enforcement of the Ban, but they then propose
enforcement paradigms (like the Service's) that exceed the
requirements of expenditure equity. Critics of the Ban concede the
government's interest in expenditure equity, but argue that speech or
religious liberty rights trump it, and warrant at least some limited
subsidization.13
In contrast to the solutions proposed in the past, this article
attempts to develop an enforcement paradigm that fully serves the
interests of expenditure equity, while fully acknowledging the
importance of the speech rights involved. This enforcement paradigm
necessarily focuses on funds - prohibiting a charity from using funds
raised on a tax-deductible basis for campaign-intervention purposes.
Because of its focus on funds, I have called this proposed paradigm an
"expenditure" paradigm, as opposed to the Service's current
"attribution" paradigm.14 This expenditure paradigm is an attempt to
11 For example, H.R. 2275, 110th Cong. (2007) (repealing the Campaign
Intervention Ban); Religious Freedom Act of 2007, S. 178, 110th Cong. (2007)
(permitting churches to engage in campaign intervention "in the theological or
philosophical context of such organization"); Religious Freedom Act of 2006, S. 3957,
109th Cong. (2006) (same); Houses of Worship Free Speech Restoration Act of 2005,
H.R. 235, 109th Cong. (2005) (permitting churches to engage in campaign
intervention "during religious services or gatherings"); American Jobs Creation Act
of 2004, H.R. 4520, 108th Cong. § 692 (as introduced in the House, June 4, 2004)
(permitting churches to engage in campaign intervention three times or less, so long
as it was not intentional); Houses of Worship Free Speech Restoration Act, H.R. 235,
108th Cong. (2003) (permitting churches to engage in campaign intervention "during
religious services or gatherings"); Houses of Worship Political Speech Protection Act,
S. 2886, 107th Cong. (2002) (providing a de minimis exception to the Ban for churches
and related entities); Bright-Line Act of 2001, H.R. 2931, 107th Cong. (2001)
(permitting churches to make annual expenditures for campaign-intervention
purposes of up to five percent of gross revenues); Houses of Worship Political Speech
Protection Act, H.R. 2357, 107th Cong. (2001) (completely exempting churches from
the Ban).
12 See, e.g., Murphy, supra note 8, at 80 (arguing that "[n]o cash grant should be
given to an organization that engages in political activity, as this is not charitable
work"); Tobin, supra note 8, at 1319 ("providing [501(c)(3)] organizations with a
subsidy to participate in political campaigns harms both 501(c)(3) organizations and
our democratic process").
13 See, generally, note 9, supra.
14 The focus on finds is also supported by the government's interest in
advancing the intentions of donors. Some argue that gifts to charities should not be
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tailor the Ban as closely as possible to the government's interest in
expenditure equity, eschewing any attempt to go beyond what is
necessitated by the government's interest in expenditure equity."
Developing an "expenditure" paradigm that fully advances the
interests of expenditure equity is, however, more complicated than it
initially appears. That is because of the difficulty inherent in
conceiving valuation methods - really, accounting practices - that
would permit an organization, and the Service, to ensure that no tax-
deductible funds were used for campaign-intervention activities. This
general problem is exacerbated by the fact that one could argue that
every time candidate-intervention speech can be attributed to a
charity, that charity's credibility is implicated - in which case the
expenditures made by the charity to build its credibility were made, to
some extent at least, in the service of campaign intervention. Crafting
an expenditure paradigm that takes these credibility expenditures into
account in a compelling way is daunting indeed. In 2002, a Service
representative asked a rhetorical question at a congressional hearing
on the Ban: "For example, what is the expenditure related to an
endorsement of a candidate during a sermon from the pulpit?"'6
Commentators have asked the same question, and, surprisingly, have
never attempted to answer it in a systematic or serious way. 7 If the
constitutional analysis in this article is correct, then it is impermissible
for Congress to prohibit churches (and other charities) from endorsing
a candidate unless that prohibition is related to some expenditure. In
Part V, this article argues that an endorsement during a minister's
used by those charities for campaign-intervention activities because donors do not
intend for their donations to be used for such purposes. The point is well taken, but -
like the interest in expenditure equity - can only justify a restriction on the use of
funds not an outright ban.
15 I have avoided calling the solution "narrowly tailored" because of the current
debate about what constitutional standard should apply to the issue, discussed infra at
note 60.
16 Miller, Hearings, supra note 7. To be fair, the Service's attribution-based
enforcement strategy, discussed infra at Part IV, could be considered to be an attempt
to address the expenditure issues discussed in this article - especially the
"credibility" factor. This article argues that the Service's approach of banning all
attributable speech is constitutionally problematic, but that the underlying concern
with the "value" of the attribution may well be proper, and may well justify an
expenditure approach that takes the "cost" of a charity's credibility into account. See
infra Part V(B)(3).
17 For example, Chris Kemmitt proposes banning only expenditures of tax-
exempt money for partisan purposes, and he calls enforcement of this proposal "a
simple matter." Kemmitt, supra note 9, at 176.
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sermon does entail a cost, and it attempts to explore the complications
inherent in measuring that cost. In Part VI, two potential solutions are
proposed.
18
I am agnostic about whether a solution like the ones proposed in
this article could simultaneously resolve constitutional concerns and
fully advance the interest in expenditure equity. I have not found a
theoretical model from which a practical set of valuation rules could
be drawn with sufficient specificity to allay all concerns. But I am
convinced that adopting an expenditure paradigm - even one that is
not entirely satisfactory - would produce multiple benefits, including,
most importantly, paying due reverence to the free speech rights that
are being trampled by the current interpretation. It is also my
suspicion that adopting an expenditure paradigm could potentially
decrease campaign intervention by 501(c)(3) organizations. This is so
primarily for two reasons. First, I believe that if the Service could
shift its enforcement paradigm and focus on the use of tax-deductible
funds by 501(c)(3) organizations - if it could corral its enforcement
to properly advancing the government's justifiable interest in
expenditure equity - then it arguably could enforce the provision
more vigorously since its opponents would have had their most
powerful defensive argument removed.19 Second, if the Service could
18 This article looks for solutions that could be adopted with little or no change
to the statutory framework. It is beyond the scope of this article to discuss the myriad
ways that Congress could constitutionally advance expenditure equity goals if it were
inclined to change the law.
19 To date, the Service has not vigorously enforced the Ban. Prior to 2004, the
Service had no systematic approach to enforcing the Campaign Intervention Ban. In
2004, 2006 and 2008, the Service conducted Political Activity Compliance Initiatives
("PACI"). As of May 30, 2007, the Service reported that 105 of the 110 cases selected
in 2004 have been closed. I.R.S., 2006 Political Activities Compliance Initiative 1, 5
(May 30, 2007). Of those closed cases, 22% resulted in a finding of "political
intervention not substantiated," 6% resulted in a revocation or proposed revocation,
and 66% resulted in a finding that political activity was substantiated, but the Service
took no action other than providing a written advisory. Id. at 5. Interestingly, when
non-church charities are removed from the data, the revocations and proposed
revocations drop to zero and the number of cases in which political activity was
substantiated but only a written advisory was provided jumps to 92%. Id. In other
words, 92% of churches investigated were found to have engaged in some prohibited
campaign intervention, but the IRS chose not to penalize of any of them. As of March
2008, only 40 of the 100 cases selected for the 2006 PACI have been closed. Id. at 1, 5.
But the trend of providing written advisories to organizations that have been
determined to have violated the Ban continues (65% of closed cases). Id. at 5. No
data is available yet from the 2008 PACI. These numbers suggest that the IRS is not
yet ready to vigorously enforce the Ban, even if it is making progress in attempting to
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develop a valuation paradigm that identified the hidden costs of
campaign-intervention speech - even imperfectly - such activities by
501(c)(3) organizations may be discouraged based on their cost alone.
Thus, a shift to an "expenditure" paradigm - far from resulting in
increased campaign intervention by charities - may discourage it.
II. BURDENS AND BENEFITS CONTAINED
IN SECTION 501(C)(3) OF THE CODE
As discussed above, at its core the Ban is an attempt to prevent
the benefits of 501(c)(3) status from being used for campaign
intervention.0 The Ban only applies to 501(c)(3) organizations, not to
other 501(c) organizations, although other 501(c) organizations are
restricted in the amount of campaign-intervention activities that they21
may pursue. Other tax-exempt organizations have campaign
monitor compliance. For a minor update of the results of the 2004 PACI, see Treas.
Inspector Gen. for Admin., Improvements Have Been Made to Educate Tax-Exempt
Organizations and Enforce the Prohibition Against Political Activities, but Further
Improvements are Possible, Ref. No. 2008-10-117 (reporting only 5 outstanding
investigations as of January 25, 2008).
20 Violation of the Ban is punishable by revocation of the organization's tax-
exempt status under section 501(c)(3). In addition, organizations that lose their
exemption because of campaign-intervention activities do not qualify for exemption
under 501(c)(4). See I.R.C. § 504. Also, punitive excise taxes may be assessed against
organizations and individuals for engaging in campaign-intervention activities. See
I.R.C. § 4955; Treas. Reg. § 53.4955-1 (1995).
21 For example, 501(c)(4) organizations may be restricted in the amount of
campaign intervention activities they conduct, but they are not banned from
conducting any campaign intervention activities. Section 501(c)(4) of the Code states
that an organization described therein must be "operated exclusively for the
promotion of social welfare." I.R.C. § 501(c)(4). While the Regulations specify that
"[tlhe promotion of social welfare does not include direct or indirect participation or
intervention in political campaigns on behalf of or in opposition to any candidate for
public office," Treas. Reg. § 1.501(c)(4)-1(a)(2)(ii) (1990), they also define
"exclusively" in the Code to mean "primarily." Treas. Reg. § 1.501(c)(4)-1(a)(2)(i)
(1990). The Service has expressed the view that campaign intervention activities are
permitted so long as they do not overwhelm the primary activity of the organization.
See Rev. Rul. 81-95, 1981-1 C.B. 332 (holding that a section 501(c)(4) organization
may intervene in campaigns so long as it is "primarily engaged in activities that
promote social welfare"); John Francis Reilly & Barbara A. Braig Allen, Political
Campaign and Lobbying Activities of IRS 501(c) (4), (c) (5), and (c) (6) Organizations,
in EXEMPT ORGANIZATIONS CONTINUING PROFESSIONAL EDUCATION TECHNICAL
INSTRUCTION PROGRAM FOR FISCAL YEAR 2003 L-1, L-2, L-3 (2002). The Service has
never specified the amount of campaign intervention activities that would be
permitted, or the method for measuring the quantity of such activities.
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intervention as their primary purpose. 2 Similarly, individuals may of
course engage in campaign intervention. Under campaign-finance
law, corporations (both business corporations and some nonprofits)
are prevented from using the "treasury funds" to engage in certain
23campaign-intervention activities. But the reach of this prohibition is
significantly more modest than the Ban, and it permits activities by
corporations that are prohibited to 501(c)(3) organizations under the
Ban.24
If the Ban is the burden that distinguishes 501(c)(3) organizations
from all other taxpayers, there is only one significant benefit that
distinguishes 501(c)(3) organizations from other taxpayers: donations
to charities subject to the Ban are generally deductible from the gross
income of their donors for income tax purposes.2 The deductibility of
donations is often called a "subsidy" because it permits a donor to
26
make a donation with "pretax" dollars. When a donor "deducts" his
22 Under section 527, "political organizations" are not taxed on contributions,
membership dues, or proceeds of a political fundraising event, entertainment event,
or bingo game, although the provision imposes a tax on income earned by such
organizations through other means (such as investments). See I.R.C. § 527(b)(1),
(c)(3). In addition, section 527 imposes a tax on investment income earned by a
501(c) organization that engages in campaign intervention activities, thus creating an
incentive for 501(c)(4) organizations that wish to engage in campaign intervention to
do it through a "separate segregated fund." See I.R.C. § 527(f).
23 See Federal Election Campaign Act of 1971, as amended (FECA), 2 U.S.C. §§
431-57.
24 See id. The "modest" reach of FECA is due in part to the Supreme Court's
defense of corporate speech rights. See, e.g., Buckley v. Valeo, 424 U.S. 1 (1975). The
interplay between speech rights in the context of election law and in the context of tax
law is beyond the scope of this article.
25 See I.R.C. § 170(a)(1), (c)(2). Contributions to 501(c)(3) organizations are
also exempt from gift tax under section 2522 and from estate tax under section
2055(a)(2).
26 For a discussion of "after tax" status of most campaign intervention
expenditures under federal law, see, e.g., Gregg D. Polsky, A Tax Lawyer's
Perspective on Section 527 Organizations, 28 CARDOZO L. REV. 1773, 1775-1778
(2007). As discussed above, this difference between "pre-tax" and "post-tax" dollars
is normally described as a subsidy from the federal government. But the equity issues
are not avoided if one argues that it is inappropriate to regard this distinction as a
subsidy. For example, Johnny Rex Buckles argues that the deductibility of
contributions to charity "properly" reflects the tax base (and is therefore not a
subsidy) because those contributions are "properly attributed not to individual
community members, but to the community itself, and the community is not an
appropriate object of taxation." Buckles, Peep, supra note 9, at 1082. If passing
campaign contributions through a 501(c)(3) organization enhances their value relative
to direct expenditures by individuals because the contribution to the charity can be
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donation, he reduces his or her taxable income by the amount of the
donation. 2' Thus, the amount donated has, at least theoretically,
avoided taxation. The fact that dollars contributed to 501(c)(3)
organizations are transformed into "pre-tax" dollars has the potential
to create substantial incentives to use 501(c)(3) organizations as
intermediaries in transactions by non-exempt taxpayers.28
deducted while a direct contribution to the candidate cannot it is immaterial whether
this difference is called a subsidy or not.
27 Some commentators, however, have pointed out that the tax liability of many
donors to 501(c)(3) organizations, especially churches, may not actually be reduced
on account of their donations because many taxpayers do not itemize deductions. See,
e.g., Douglas H. Cook, The Politically Active Church, 35 LOY. U. CHI. L.J. 457, 471
(2004) (citing Warren Rojas, Finance Looks at Proposals on Charitable Giving, 32
EXEMPT ORG. TAX REV. 245 (2001) for the statistic that seventy percent of taxpayers
do not currently itemize). For that reason, some have argued that funds donated to
501(c)(3) organizations, in general, are not subsidized. See, e.g., Samansky, supra note
9, at 151-52 ("the problem of using tax-deductible contributions for political purposes
should not be overemphasized. Churches receive much of their contributions from
individuals who do not itemize their deductions and thus receive no tax benefit from
their charitable donations.") This is an important practical observation, and may be
relevant to a church's ability to forego the benefit of deductibility of contributions.
See Michael Hatfield, Ignore the Rumors -Campaigning from the Pulpit is Okay:
Thinking Past the Symbolism of Section 501 (c)(3), 20 NOTRE DAME J.L. ETHICS AND
PUB. POL'Y 125, 128 (2006). However, as Hatfield points out, that is an empirical
question the answer to which will differ on a case by case basis. See id. While it is true
that at least some organizations (and perhaps especially churches) may over-estimate
the value of the deductibility of donations, the fact that it appears almost universal
that churches choose to be exempt under section 501(c)(3) suggests that they at least
perceive some benefit. Even if the deductibility of donations has no value for some
organizations, it is legislative concern with the fairness of permitting deductible
contributions to 501(c)(3) organizations that motivates the expenditure equity
concerns underlying the Campaign Intervention Ban. The fact that many taxpayers do
not itemize deductions is a flawed basis for an argument about equity issues. See
generally Ellen P. Aprill, Churches, Politics and the Charitable Contribution
Deduction, 42 B.C. L. REV. 843 (2001) (discussing policy rationales for the charitable
contribution deduction). The purpose of the standard deduction is to enable
taxpayers with a moderate amount of deductions to avoid the compliance hassles of
itemization, and in most cases the standard deduction permits the taxpayer greater tax
savings than itemization would permit. See id. at 850. The legislative history of the
standard deduction reveals that its proponents felt they were "tak[ing] account of the
average charitable contribution by two and a half percent." Id. at 852 (citing 90 CONG.
REC. 3973 (1944) (statement of Rep. Robertson)). It is inconsistent to argue that the
itemized deductions replaced by the standard deduction are thereby erased. They still
exist, and the taxpayer still benefits from them (at least in theory); she just saves some
record-keeping annoyance.
28 The Code has various provisions designed to prevent 501(c)(3) organizations
from permitting donors receive private benefits in exchange for contributions. For
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As discussed above, it is the deductibility of contributions to
501(c)(3) organizations that creates the government interest in
preventing campaign intervention by 501(c)(3) organizations, which I
call "expenditure equity." The statutory scheme generally prevents
other taxpayers from using "pre-tax" dollars to support candidates,
and so it would be inequitable for 501(c)(3) organizations to make
campaign contributions with pre-tax dollars. Because deductibility of
contributions is the benefit reserved for 501(c)(3) organizations and
the Ban is the burden particular to them, the connection between the
two is inevitable.9
III. THE CONSTITUTIONAL NECESSITY
OF "AFFILIATE ORGANIZATIONS"
Scholars have argued that the Campaign Intervention Ban is
30unconstitutional, or at least "constitutionally suspect," for decades.
example, under Treas. Reg. §1.170A-l(h) (2008), a contribution does not include any
amount paid as consideration for a benefit received in return for the contribution. In
addition, under I.R.C. § 4958, penalizing excise taxes can be imposed on the parties of
an "excess benefit transaction," in which insiders engage in a transaction with a
501(c)(3) organization that provides to them an impermissible private benefit.
29 For example, Ellen Aprill, in rejecting proffered rationales for the Ban stated
simply, "[a] more persuasive justification for the prohibition is that Congress did not
wish that tax-deductible contributions to be used for electioneering activities." Aprill,
supra note 27, at 844.
30 See, e.g., Wilfred R. Caron & Deirdre Dessingue, I.R.C. § 501 (c) (3): Practical
and Constitutional Implications of "Political" Activity Restrictions, 2 J.L. & POL. 169
(1985) (arguing on free exercise and free speech grounds that the Ban is
unconstitutional as applied to churches); Carroll, supra note 4 (arguing on free speech
grounds that the Ban is unconstitutional); Chisolm, supra note 9 (arguing on free
speech grounds that the Ban is unconstitutional); Edward McGlynn Gaffney, Jr., On
Not Rendering To Caesar: The Unconstitutionality of Tax Regulation of Activities of
Religious Organizations Relating to Politics, 40 DEPAUL L. REV. 1 (1990) (arguing
that the Ban violates churches' free speech and free exercise rights); Steffen N.
Johnson, Of Politics and Pulpits: A First Amendment Analysis of IRS Restrictions on
the Political Activities of Religious Organizations, 42 B.C. L. REV. 875 (2001) (arguing
that the Ban violates churches' free speech rights); Kemmitt, supra note 9 (arguing
that the Ban violates the Religious Freedom Restoration Act); Klapach, supra note 9,
at 511-19 (arguing that while the free exercise and establishment clause arguments
are unlikely to be successful, constitutional doubts continue to be raised by free
speech, vagueness, and selective prosecution arguments); Randy Lee, The
Constitution Under Clinton: A Critical Assessment: When a King Speaks to God: When
God Speaks to a King: Faith, Politics, Tax Exempt Status, and the Constitution in the
Clinton Administration, 63 LAW & CONTEMP. PROBS. 391 (2000) (arguing that the Ban
as applied violates churches' free exercise rights and violates the Establishment
Clause); Meghan J. Ryan, Can the IRS Silence Religious Organizations?, 40 IND. L.
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This article addresses only what I take to be the most compelling
argument - that "[a]lthough the decision to withhold the subsidy of
exemption and deductibility from the political activity of charitable
organizations is probably justified, the further effects of the
[Campaign Intervention Ban] provision are not."31 In so doing, this
article essentially reproduces an argument made by Laura Brown
Chisolm eighteen years ago.32 The core of the argument is that to the
degree that the Ban imposes more than a restriction on using tax-
deductible funds for campaign intervention - to the degree it goes
beyond advancing a concern with expenditure equity - it violates the
Constitution.33
Chisolm's argument is premised on the observation that political
speech, including speech expressing the speaker's views about
candidates and their suitability for office, is protected under the First
Amendment34 and that the speech of organizations, as well as that of
REV. 73 (2007) (arguing that the Ban is unconstitutional as applied to churches
because of a "hybrid" free speech/free exercise claim); Samansky, supra note 9, at 175
(arguing that the Ban is "constitutionally suspect" as applied to churches under the
free exercise clause); Smith, supra note 9 (arguing that the Ban as applied to churches
violates the free speech, free exercise, and possibly establishment clauses);
Zimmerman, supra note 9, at 266 (arguing that the Ban constitutes an "impermissible
hindrance" to free exercise and free speech rights).
31 Chisolm, supra note 9, at 327.
32 Chisolm, supra note 9, at 319-53.
33 Following Chisolm, I focus the constitutional analysis on free speech
principles. Many commentators instead have argued that the Ban is unconstitutional
because it violates the Free Exercise Clause, emphasizing the differences between
churches and other 501(c)(3) organizations. This article does not address these
arguments. Because a church's right to political speech, including the express
endorsement of candidates, is protected under the Constitution, it is not clear what is
added when one asserts (however truthfully) that a church's religious mission may
require it to engage in such speech. That being said, it is worth acknowledging that the
fundamental premise of many of these articles - that the Campaign Intervention Ban
may apply to religiously mandated speech, and therefore may force churches to make
a choice between 501(c)(3) status and fulfilling their religious mission - should not
be taken lightly. As commentators have pointed out, there may be some whose
religious commitments are such that the Ban impedes their ability to meet their
religious obligations. See, e.g., Lee, supra note 30, at 401.
U Chisolm supra note 9, at 319, n.59 (citing Monitor Patriot Co. v. Roy, 401 U.S.
265, 272 (1971) (noting that discussions of candidates is speech to which the First
Amendment "has its fullest and most urgent application"); Buckley v. Valeo, 424 U.S.
1, 14 (1976) (stating that "debate on the qualifications of candidates" is among "the
most fundamental First Amendment activities"); Mills v. Alabama, 384 U.S. 214, 218
(1966) ("Whatever differences may exist about interpretations of the First
Amendment, there is practically universal agreement that a major purpose of that
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natural persons, is protected.3 5 Having established that campaign-
intervention speech by organizations is generally protected under the
First Amendment, Chisolm argues that the so-called "unconstitutional
conditions" doctrine applies to the Campaign Intervention Ban
because the Ban requires "an organization to choose between
exercising its right to political expression and receiving a benefit to
which it is otherwise entitled.,
36
The leading case is Regan v. Taxation With Representation of
Washington (TWR).37 In that case, the Supreme Court held that the
lobbying restrictions contained in section 501(c)(3) of the Code did
not infringe the First Amendment free-speech rights of an
organization that was exempt under section 501(c)(3). 3 The analysis
in that case depended on distinguishing Speiser v. Randall, which held
that the U.S. Constitution prohibited the California constitution from
requiring that veterans sign a loyalty oath to receive benefits, 9 from
Cammarano v. U.S., which held that the Constitution did not prohibit
Congress from refusing to permit a business deduction for business
corporations engaged in lobbying.40 The distinction between these
cases made by the Court, as Chisolm points out, is that the
nondeductibility provision in Cammarano "simply [requires
taxpayers] to pay for those [constitutionally protected] activities
entirely out of their own pockets" while "the provision challenged in
Amendment was to protect the free discussion of governmental affairs. This of course
includes discussions of candidates .... ")). Just last term, the Court reiterated this
position in FEC v. Wis. Right to Life, Inc., 127 S. Ct. 2652, 2663-64 (2007) (holding
that discussion of candidates' qualifications, including expressly advocating their
election or defeat, is "political speech" and is therefore "subject to strict scrutiny").
35 Chisolm supra note 9, at 320, n.63 (citing Consolidated Edison Co. v. Public
Serv. Comm'n, 447 U.S. 530, 533 (1980); First Nat'l Bank of Boston v. Belotti, 435
U.S. 765, 777 (1978)). See, also FEC v. Mass. Citizens for Life, Inc., 479 U.S. 238
(1986).
6 Chisolm, supra note 9, at 319-20. The unconstitutional conditions doctrine has
been called "the basic structural issue that for over a hundred years has bedeviled
courts and commentators alike." Richard A. Epstein, Unconstitutional Conditions,
State Power, and the Limits of Consent, 102 HARV. L. REV. 4, 6 (1988), quoted in Rust
v. Sullivan, 500 U.S. 173, 205 (1991) (Blackmun, J., dissenting).
37 Regan v. Taxation With Representation of Washington (TWR), 461 U.S. 540
(1983).
M Id. at 546. As discussed supra note 2, section 501(c)(3) prohibits campaign
intervention activities and separately restricts the total amount of lobbying activities
that may be conducted by a charity.
39 Speiser v. Randall, 357 U.S. 513 (1958).
40 Cammarano v. U.S., 358 U.S. 498 (1959); see also 461 U.S. at 545-51 for the
Court's discussion of Speiser and Cammarano.
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Speiser did not merely decline to help pay for particular speech, but
rather extracted an independent penalty (in the form of a withheld
benefit) unless the taxpayer agreed to forgo the exercise of his
guaranteed right of free expression."'" Under this analysis, it first
appears that the ban on lobbying found in Section 501(c)(3) should be
unconstitutional, because by denying tax-exempt status to anyone who
engages in substantial lobbying, it goes beyond prohibiting the use of
deductible contributions for lobbying.
But the Court found that it was not unconstitutional, explaining
that the organization is not faced with an unconstitutional condition
because the Code permits the 501(c)(3) organization to conduct
unlimited lobbying activities, so long as it uses a non-501(c)(3) affiliate
42to fund them. The Court noted that TWR was created to carry on
the activities of two separate organizations: one exempt under
501(c)(3) and one exempt under 501(c)(4).43 Prior to the formation of
TWR, these two organizations divided up the activities that were later
assumed by TWR, with the 501(c)(3) conducting activities that were
intended to avoid the political activity restrictions in the Code and the
501(c)(4) conducting those activities that are the subject of these
restrictions." The Court noted that despite the fact that TWR's
exemption could be denied because of substantial lobbying, such
denial is not a penalty because,
TWR can obtain tax-deductible contributions for its
nonlobbying activity by returning to the dual structure it used
in the past, with a §501(c)(3) organization for non-lobbying
activities and a §501(c)(4) organization for lobbying. TWR
would, of course, have to ensure that §501(c)(3) organization
did not subsidize the §501(c)(4) organization; otherwise
41 Chisolm supra note 9, at 323 (quoting Cammarano, 358 U.S. at 513). Justice
Douglas illustrated this distinction very clearly in his concurrence in Cammarano. He
wrote: "[I]f Congress had gone so far as to deny all deductions for 'ordinary and
necessary business expenses' if a taxpayer spent money to promote or oppose
initiative measures, then it would be placing a penalty on the exercise of First
Amendment rights." 358 U.S. at 515 (Douglas, J., concurring).
42 See Chisolm, supra note 9, at 325 (citing TWR, 461 U.S. at 545) (noting that
"the Internal Revenue Code allows the organization to segregate the nonsubsidized
activity fiscally and structurally and thereby avoid the independent penalty effect of
the provision").
43 TWR, 461 U.S. at 543.
" Id.
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public funds might be spent on activity Congress chose not to
subsidize.45
The Court differentiated between an over-all statutory structure that
prevented certain activities from being subsidized from one that
prevented an organization that engages in certain activities from
receiving government benefits for anything, stating, "Congress has
merely refused to pay for the lobbying out of public moneys., 46 The
avenue for TWR to conduct substantial lobbying activities is provided
in the Code: it must simply create a 501(c)(4) affiliate to carry on
those activities with non-subsidized donations.
In this article, I call the mechanism described by the Court -
which saves section 501(c)(3) from imposing an unconstitutional
condition on charitable entities wishing to engage in substantial
lobbying - the "affiliate organization solution., 47 If it is true that the
only thing that saves the lobbying provision in section 501(c)(3) from
being an unconstitutional condition is the fact that a 501(c)(3)
organization can use an affiliate organization to do its lobbying for it,
the Campaign Intervention Ban is also an unconstitutional condition
unless a similar solution exists to enable 501(c)(3) organizations to
conduct campaign intervention activities through an affiliate
48 49
organization - or so the argument goes.
45 Id. at 544.
46 Id. at 545.
47 See Miriam Galston, Campaign Speech and Contextual Analysis, 6 FIRST
AMEND. L. REV. 100 (2007) (calling the affiliate organization solution the "alternate
channel doctrine").
48 The TWR Court made clear that the Service's interpretation of the interaction
between sections 501(c)(3) and 501(c)(4) of the Code is essential to those provisions'
constitutionality. The Court described a concern by some amici that the Service would
"impose stringent requirements that are unrelated to the congressional purpose of
ensuring that no tax-deductible contributions are used to pay for substantial lobbying,
and effectively make it impossible for a 501(c)(3) organization to establish a 501(c)(4)
lobbying affiliate." TVR, 461 U.S. at 544 n.6. The Court noted that "[n]o such
requirement in the Code or regulations has been called to our attention, nor have we
been able to discover one. The IRS apparently requires only that the two groups be
separately incorporated and keep records adequate to show that tax-deductible
contributions are not used to pay for lobbying." Id. Thus, the Court's reasoning
suggests that a Service regulatory paradigm that unduly burdened the ability of a
501(c)(3) organization to use a 501(c)(4) affiliate to conduct its lobbying could render
the statutory scheme unconstitutional. See id. Justice Blackmun made this point even
more explicitly in his concurrence, stating, "[a]s long as the IRS goes no further than
this, we perhaps can safely say that '[the] Code does not deny TWR... any
independent benefit on account of its intention to lobby.'... A §501(c)(3)
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The concurrence by Justice Blackmun (joined by Justices
Brennan and Marshall) was even more explicit about the dependence
of the constitutionality of the political activity restrictions in section
501(c)(3) on the affiliate organization solution. 50 Justice Blackmun
wrote that,
[blecause lobbying is protected by the First Amendment...
§501(c)(3) therefore denies a significant benefit to
organizations choosing to exercise their constitutional rights.
The constitutional defect that would inhere in §501(c)(3)
alone is avoided by §501(c)(4). As the Court notes... TWR
may use its present §501(c)(3) organization for its
nonlobbying activities and may create a §501(c)(4) affiliate to
pursue its charitable goals through lobbying."51
organization's right to speak is not infringed, because it is free to make known its
views on legislation through its 501(c)(4) affiliate without losing tax benefits for its
nonlobbying activities." Id. at 553 (Blackmun, J., concurring) (citation omitted).
49 As Chisolm argued, the Ban is unconstitutional because "[n]o effective
alternative avenues for nonsubsidized expression of campaign-related political
opinion are available to a section 501(c)(3) organization." Chisolm, supra note 9, at
328.
50 As several commentators have pointed out, the Court's opinion relies on the
logic of Justice Blackmun's concurrence. If there was any doubt that Justice
Blackmun's concurrence correctly states the law, it was resolved in FCC v. League of
Women Voters, 468 U.S. 364, 400 (1984), in which the Court adopted Justice
Blackmun's reasoning.
51 TWR, 461 U.S. at 552 (Blackmun, J., concurring) (citations omitted). Justice
Blackmun also makes explicit in his concurrence that the 501(c)(3) organization itself
has constitutionally protected speech rights. Because of that, the 501(c)(3)
organization must be afforded some opportunity to communicate its views in such a
way that they may be attributed to it, and not to some affiliate. Justice Blackmun
wrote:
It must be remembered that §501(c)(3) organizations retain their
constitutional right to speak and to petition the Government. Should the
IRS attempt to limit the control these organizations exercise over the
lobbying of their §501(c)(4) affiliates, the First Amendment problems
would be insurmountable. It hardly answers one person's objection to a
restriction on his speech that another person, outside his control, may
speak for him. Similarly, an attempt to prevent §501(c)(4) organizations
from lobbying explicitly on behalf of their §501(c)(3) affiliates would
perpetuate §501(c)(3) organizations' inability to make known their views
on legislation without incurring the unconstitutional penalty. Such
restrictions would extend far beyond Congress' mere refusal to subsidize
[Vol. 28:673
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In the same term as TWR, the Court decided FCC v. League of
Women Voters, striking down a law denying funding to radio stations
that "engage in editorializing." 2 In that case, the Court recognized
that if Congress had structured the law so that recipient stations could
"establish 'affiliate' organizations which could then use the station's
facilities to editorialize with nonfederal funds, such statutory
mechanism would plainly be valid."53 As it had in TWR, the Court
reasoned that constitutionally-protected speech was not being
burdened as long as the speaker was free to engage in protected
speech. The government was free to prohibit the use of government
funds or subsidies for such speech even if such prohibition forced the
speaker to use a separate legal entity to communicate its message.
However, a statutory scheme that makes it impossible for an entity to
engage in protected speech without forfeiting a subsidy for more than
just that speech would be prohibited.
The Court relied on the existence of a sort of "affiliate
organization solution" in Rust v. Sullivan as well 4 There the Court
facially upheld an administrative interpretation of federal law that
conditioned provision of funds for family planning on government-
funded projects refraining from providing information about abortion
to patients. Central to the Court's holding was the fact that the
"regulations do not force the Title X grantee to give up abortion-
related speech; they merely require that the grantee keep such
activities separate and distinct from Title X activities."5 The Court
emphasized the distinction between a restriction on the project (which
can give no abortion-related information) and the grantee (who is free
to do so outside the context of the program). The Court then
analogized to the affiliate organization solution discussed in TWR and
League of Women Voters.
While the Supreme Court has only addressed the lobbying
restriction and not the Campaign Intervention Ban, the D.C. Circuit
has analyzed the Campaign Intervention Ban. 6 Here, the court
treated the First Amendment claim by a church under a free exercise,
lobbying.... In my view, any such restriction would render the statutory
scheme unconstitutional.
Id. at 553-54 (Blackmun, J., concurring) (emphasis added) (citation omitted).
52 FCC v. League of Women Voters, 468 U.S. 364, 366, 402 (1984).
53 Id. at 400.
Rust v. Sullivan, 500 U.S. 173 (1991).
5 Id. at 196.
_% Branch Ministries v. Rossotti, 211 F.3d 137 (D.C. Cir. 2000).
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rather than a free speech, analysis. 7  The court makes it clear,
however, that the affiliate organization solution, described in TWR, is
essential to its holding that the Ban does not violate the church's
constitutional rights. It found that
three members of the Supreme Court stated that the
availability of such an alternative means of communication is
essential to the constitutionality of section 501(c)(3)'s
restrictions on lobbying. The Court subsequently confirmed
that this was an accurate description of its holding. See FCC
v. League of Women Voters, 468 U.S. 364, 400 (1984)....
The Church has such an avenue available to it. As was the
case in TWR, the Church may form a related organization
under 501(c)(4) of the Code.... Such organizations are
exempt from taxation; but unlike their section 501(c)(3)
counterparts, contributions to them are not deductible.58
Thus, the court's holding was dependent on the availability of an
affiliate organization solution, like those identified in TWR, League of
Women Voters, and Rust v. Sullivan.
Other recent cases in the Second Circuit Court of Appeals have
reaffirmed the basic principle that when the government provides
funds to an organization on condition that the organization not use
those funds to engage in certain activities, it must ensure that there is
an adequate alternate channel available for the organizations to
engage in constitutionally protected activities using private funds.5 9
While these cases raise the question of what standard a court should
apply in determining whether the "alternate channel" provided under
the law is sufficient to avoid constitutional concerns, they appear to
agree that an "adequate" alternative channel is one that does not
57 It found that the free exercise rights of the church were not substantially
burdened (the first prong of the test) because its withdrawal from electoral politics
will not "violate its beliefs," and because a decrease in the amount of money available
for its religious practices "is not constitutionally significant." Id. at 142 (citation
omitted). The court also separately held that the church's free speech rights were not
violated because of viewpoint discrimination because "[t]he restrictions imposed by
section 501(c)(3) are viewpoint neutral." Id. at 144.
5 Id. at 143.
59 See, e.g., Velazquez v. Legal Services Corp. (Velazquez IV), 349 F. Supp. 2d
566, 600 (E.D.N.Y. 2004); Brooklyn Legal Services Corp. v. Legal Services Corp.
(Velazquez V), 462 F.3d 219, 232 (2d Cir. 2006); Alliance for Open Society Int'l, Inc.
v. U.S. Agency for Int'l Dev., 430 F. Supp. 2d 222,259 (S.D.N.Y. 2006).
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"unduly burden" the speech of recipients of government largesse. 60
That is, the statutory scheme only imposes burdens (1) that are
reasonably related to the government's legitimate interests and (2)
that are not overall so costly as to prevent constitutionally protected
61
speech.
The second prong of the "undue burden" test presumably
involves a case-by-case analysis of the overall cost for specific
organizations to engage in protected campaign-intervention speech in
62
compliance with the Campaign Intervention Ban. But the first prong
demands that the Ban be crafted only to advance the government's
interest and not go beyond. Therefore, if government interests only
justify banning the expenditure of tax-deductible funds on campaign
60 In TWR and Rust v. Sullivan, the court held that the legislation at issue was
authorized under Congress's very broad spending power, which is conferred under
Art. I, § 8, cl. 1.1 of the Constitution. If only Congress's spending power is at issue,
legislation would presumably only violate the Constitution if there were no rational
basis for it, which is a very low bar. Since TWR, League of Women Voters and Rust v.
Sullivan relied on the existence (or lack) of an adequate alternative channel, and that
alternative channel imposed some burden on an organization's speech, the natural
question is: what standard should a court employ to evaluate the adequacy of the
alternative channel? Must its burdens be justified as "narrowly tailored" to advance
the government's interest or can they be only "rationally related" to such interests?
At least one commentator has described the Court's treatment of the proper standard
of review in alternative channel cases as "murky, circular, and subject to at least two
possible interpretations." Edward Chaney, Velazquez v. Legal Services Corporation:
Unconstitutional Conditions and First Amendment Rights of Nonprofit Organizations
and Their Donors, 4 FIRST AMEND. L. REV. 267, 280 (2006). In Velazquez IV, 349 F.
Supp. 2d at 600, the United States District Court for the Eastern District of New York
concluded that the proper test of whether a regulation of content-neutral speech
imposes an "undue burden" is "an intermediate form of review" that is neither
rational review nor strict scrutiny, but which instead requires a balancing of the
government's interests against the speaker's rights. The Second Circuit Court of
Appeals subsequently reversed Velazquez IV, holding that the alternative channel
must be "adequate" but that no heightened standard of review was appropriate to
determine its adequacy. See Velazquez V, 462 F.3d at 232.
61 See Velazquez V, 462 F.3d at 232 (holding that "[b]y definition, an alternative
is inadequate if the government substantially or unduly burdens the ability to create
the alternative" and that "separation requirements" may be unconstitutional if "they
imposed extraordinary burdens that impede grantees from exercising their First
Amendment rights, created prohibitive costs of compliance, and demanded an
unjustifiable degree of separation of affiliates").
62 Michael Hatfield has done the most to evaluate what the burden of foregoing
501(c)(3) status would be for a church. See Hatfield, supra note 27, at 148-69. His
main point is that churches may overestimate the burden, but he concedes that the
cost for each church must be determined on a case-by-case basis, and may be
significant in certain instances.
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intervention, a Ban that absolutely prohibited campaign-intervention
speech by 501(c)(3) organizations - irrespective of the use of funds -
would be impermissible. Forcing an organization to forgo or give up
501(c)(3) status in order to engage in campaign-intervention speech is
an "undue burden" because it is not justified by the government's
interest in expenditure equity. If an activity is truly free - or is fully
reimbursed by a non-501(c)(3) organization - then the argument is
that the Constitution requires that 501(c)(3) organizations be
permitted to engage in it.
63
Of course, one could argue that the Service's method is justified
by some government interest other than expenditure equity, if an
interest could be found that could justify the burden imposed under
the Service's current enforcement paradigm. So, it is worth asking
whether there is another governmental interest - other than
expenditure equity - that is reasonably related to the Service's
interpretation of the Ban. Because of an absence of legislative history,
scholars have had to speculate about potential government interests.64
Some have attempted to review other potential governmental
• 65
interests - such as protection of churches' independence, avoidance
63 In Rust v. Sullivan, the Court held that the government was justified in
requiring that an organization carry on its subsidized activities and its unsubsidized
activities in separate places and with separate employees. Rust v. Sullivan, 500 U.S.
173, 191 (1991). However, these so-called "program integrity" requirements were
explicitly justified by the government on the grounds that without them "the public
can get the impression that Federal funds are being improperly used for
[unsubsidized] activities." Id. at 188. That justification simply doesn't apply to the
charitable context. If the government is justified in being concerned that the public
could get the impression that a charity is using the subsidies provided under the Code
to say something like, "elect Candidate X," mustn't it be equally concerned that the
charity is using the funds to say "Jesus is the one true way" or "There is no God but
Allah"? In other words, the fact that the subsidy is constitutionally available for
religious speech suggests that there is no danger that the public will understand the
subsidy to imply a governmental endorsement of a charity's speech.
See, e.g., Lloyd Hitoshi Mayer, Grasping Smoke: Enforcing the Ban on
Political Activity By Charities, 6 FIRST AMEND. L. REV. 1, 2 (2007) [hereinafter,
Mayer, Grasping Smoke] ("[diespite valiant attempts by many scholars, the exact
reasons behind Congress' enactment of the prohibition remain obscure").
65 Some commentators have argued that engaging in campaign intervention is
bad for churches for any number of reasons, and that protecting churches from
themselves or from vulnerability to political actors who would make use of them may
be an important government interest. See, e.g., Tobin, supra note 8, at 1322-25
(arguing that intervention harms churches because they may be co-opted by
government, candidates may be tempted to intimidate churches, campaign
intervention may result in politically "preferred" churches, and political intervention
may cause discord within churches). While some of these concerns may constitute
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of private benefit, and definitional consistency in the concept of
charity66 - but none have found a compelling one. 61 In the campaign
context, it is obvious to think first of the governmental interests
generally justifying regulation of campaign finance.6' However,
legitimate government interests, it must be remembered that the fact that a specific
course of action may be best for the private actor involved does not necessarily justify
employing the coercive power of the State in favor of that action. During the
question-and-answer period following the presentation of this paper at the Loyola
Law School of Los Angeles Tax Policy Colloquium, one student commented, "I don't
want to go to a church that endorses candidates," and suggested that regulation of
church speech by the government advances the interests of church-goers who want
their churches to remain apolitical. See, also De Leon, supra note 8, at 710 (citing
evidence that "church members generally reject being told how to vote by their
churches"). But see James, supra note 9, at 371 (noting that the African-American
church was established not only to "preach the Gospel", but also to "improve socio-
economic conditions for the nation's African-Americans"). But to the degree that
commentators are concerned about religious organizations being corrupted by the
political process, the Constitution limits the power of the federal government to
control the behavior of churches, even in the church's best interests. First
Amendment values require that citizens eschew using the government to control the
speech of churches, even their own churches. That is to say, "[tihe antidote which the
Constitution provides against zealots who would inject sectarianism into the political
process is to subject their ideas to refutation in the marketplace of ideas and their
platforms to rejection at the polls." McDaniel v. Paty, 435 U.S. 618, 642 (1978)
(Brennan, J., concurring). Likewise, arguments that the Ban is justified by the
government interest in avoidance of entanglement between church and state are not
persuasive. For a discussion of why such arguments are not persuasive, see Johnny
Rex Buckles, Does the Constitutional Norm of Separation of Church and State Justify
the Denial of Tax Exemption to Churches that Engage in Partisan Political Speech?, 84
IND. L.J. 447 (2009).
66 See, e.g., Chisolm, supra note 9, at 333-52. Chisolm lists the following
potential government interests served by the Ban: (1) nonsubvention (i.e. expenditure
equity); (2) avoiding advancing "private interests;" and (3) a definitional
inconsistency between charitable and campaign-intervention activities. Id. at 352-61,
After discussing these putative interests at length, Chisolm concludes that while these
are legitimate governmental interests, none of them justifies a ban on campaign
intervention that goes beyond restricting the use of governmentally-subsidized funds.
Id. at 361.
67 See, e.g., Carroll, supra note 4, at 250-56 ("[T]he government has shown no
compelling, or even substantial, interest that would justify [a Ban that goes beyond
restricting expenditures]").
68 The Supreme Court has repeatedly held that a there is a compelling
government interest in "deterring actual corruption and avoiding any appearance
thereof." McConnell v. Federal Election Commission, 540 U.S. 93, 196 (2003). This
interest, combined with the recognition of "the corrosive and distorting effects of
immense aggregations of wealth that are accumulated with the help of the corporate
form," justifies regulation. Id. at 205 (quoting Austin v. Michigan State Chamber of
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ultimately, until the government is forced to formulate the
governmental interest - other than expenditure equity - that
justifies the application of the Ban to more than just restricting
expenditures, it is reasonable to conclude that "there is no defensible
basis for singling out Section 501(c)(3) organizations, alone among
tax-exempt groups, for loss or denial of exempt status solely on the
grounds of political speech or activity." 69
IV. Two DISTINCT MODES OF ANALYSIS:
ATTRIBUTION AND EXPENDITURE
If the Constitution requires that the Campaign Intervention Ban
go no farther than prohibiting the use of tax-deductible funds for
campaign-intervention purposes, then the Service's current
interpretation of the Ban is likely unconstitutional. The Service
currently interprets the Ban to absolutely prohibit campaign-
intervention activities that can be attributed to a 501(c)(3)
organization, no matter who pays for those activities. Thus, if a
charity wishes to endorse a candidate (officially or unofficially), its
only legal means to do so is to give up its 501(c)(3) status.
In May of 2000, the U.S. Court of Appeals for the District of
Columbia Circuit decided what is apparently the only case - Branch
Ministries v. Rossotti - in which the Service revoked the tax-exempt
• • 70
status of a church for engaging in campaign intervention. That case
Commerce, 494 U.S. 652, 660 (1990)). The Court has therefore upheld limitations on
expenditures of treasury funds by corporations and labor unions. These restrictions
have also passed constitutional muster when applied to certain non-profit
organizations that are not formed expressly for political purposes. See id. at 211;
Austin, 494 U.S. at 655. However, these restrictions only apply to the expenditure of
treasury funds, and the constitutionality of such restrictions is expressly dependent on
the ability of these organizations to use affiliates or segregated funds to engage in
campaign intervention. I know of no case that suggests that the governmental interest
in deterring corruption and avoiding the appearance thereof justifies not only a ban
on the use of an entity's funds to engage in campaign intervention, but also a ban on
the entity engaging in such speech using funds raised specifically for that purpose on a
non-tax-deductible basis. In fact, in FEC v. Massachusetts Citizens for Life, the Court
apparently held the opposite, when it found that forcing nonprofit corporations to
abide by the record-keeping and disclosure requirements of the Federal Election
Campaign Act was a substantial burden - even though such organizations receive a
"subsidy" from the federal government - stating "[tlhe fact that the statute's
practical effect may be to discourage protected speech is sufficient to characterize
§441b as an infringement on First Amendment activities." 479 U.S. 238, 255 (1986).
Carroll, supra note 4, at 219.
70 Branch Ministries v. Rossotti, 211 F.3d 137 (D.C. Cir. 2000). The District
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involved what was widely heralded as especially egregious behavior by
the church, called The Church at Pierce Creek, which had taken out a
full-page advertisement in two newspapers that "urged Christians not
to vote for then-presidential candidate Bill Clinton because of his
positions on certain moral issues."" The advertisements contained a
notation at the bottom of the page that identified its "co-sponsors"
and stated, "[tiax-deductible donations for this advertisement gladly
accepted. Make donations to: The Church at Pierce Creek."" The
court agreed with the Service that the advertisements constituted
campaign intervention prohibited under section 501(c)(3), and
rejected the church's arguments that the Service was without statutoryS 73
or constitutional authority to revoke its exemption.
While some commentators have argued that some campaign-
intervention activities should be beyond the reach of the Ban 4 few
commentators have failed to recognize that the advertisements taken
out by the Church at Pierce Creek represented an egregious breach of
the Ban,75 a view the court hearing the case expressed as well 6
However, there has been very little direct analysis of what about this
particular ad makes it such a clear violation, and why this violation so
clearly warrants enforcement of the Ban. The reason this analysis is
Court apparently accepted the Church's factual claim that the IRS had never revoked
the tax exempt status of a bona fide church before, although it noted that it had
revoked the tax-exempt status of religious organizations because of political activities
twice before. See Branch Ministries v. Rossotti, 40 F. Supp. 2d 15, 22 (D.D.C. 1999)
(citing Christian Echoes National Ministry, Inc. v. U.S., 470 F.2d 849 (10th Cir. 1973)
and discussing a case involving The Way International).
71 211 F.3d at 139. The advertisement is reproduced as an appendix in Lee, supra
note 30, at 437.
72 211 F.3d at 140.
73 The court also rejected arguments by the church that selective prosecution by
the IRS invalidated the IRS's revocation of exempt status under the Fifth
Amendment. Id. at 144-45.
74 See generally articles cited supra note 9.
75 See Hatfield, supra note 27, at 138 (stating that as "best I can tell, no legal
scholar has claimed the appeals court got it wrong."). But see Zimmerman, supra note
9, at 263 (arguing that the court "missed the point" with regard to the church's free
speech claim); Kemmitt, supra note 9, at 170 ("[W]hile the D.C. Circuit cited the
proper legal standard, it failed to apply it correctly to the facts at hand.").
76 In discussing the Church's selective prosecution claim, the District Court
stated that the Church had not identified any "other instance in which a church so
brazenly claimed responsibility for a political advertisement" and that it "provided no
evidence of an instance in which a political act could so easily be attributed to a tax-
exempt church." 40 F. Supp. 2d at 21 (emphasis added).
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necessary is that there are actually two distinct modes of analysis to
determine why the ad was a breach of the Ban.
In the Service's view, the communication to voters of a view about
a candidate for public office is sufficient to constitute a violation of
the Ban so long as the author of the communication - the speaker, so
to speak - is a 501(c)(3) organization. While commentators have
complained about a lack of clarity in guidance issued by the Service
regarding campaign intervention," the Service released guidance last
year - in the form of a revenue ruling - explaining its view on
campaign intervention by 501(c)(3) organizations from which one
message at least is clear: the Service's central concern is attribution of
a favorable or negative view of a candidate.79 That is, the Service
77 For example, the only relevant regulation is Treas. Reg. 1.501(c)(3)-
1(c)(3)(iii) (2008), which states in its entirety: "An organization is an 'action'
organization if it participates or intervenes, directly or indirectly, in any political
campaign on behalf of or in opposition to any candidate for public office. The term
'candidate for public office' means an individual who offers himself, or is proposed by
others, as a contestant for an elective public office, whether such office be national,
state, or local. Activities which constitute participation or intervention in a political
campaign on behalf of or in opposition to a candidate include, but are not limited to,
the publication or distribution of written or printed statements or the making of oral
statements on behalf of or in opposition to such a candidate." Other guidance and
enforcement action by the IRS has arguably changed in approach over time, has been
haphazard, or has failed to clearly describe the principles being applied. See, e.g., Rev.
Rul. 86-95, 1986-2 C.B. 73; Rev. Rul. 80-282, 1980-2 C.B. 178; Rev. Rul. 78-248, 1978-1
C.B. 154; I.R.S. Gen. Couns. Mem. 39,694 (Feb. 2,1988); I.R.S. Gen. Couns. Mem.
38,444 (July 15, 1980); I.R.S. Gen. Couns. Mem. 38,137 (Oct. 22, 1979); I.R.S. Gen.
Couns. Mem. 35,902 (July 15, 1974); I.R.S. Tech. Adv. Mem. 200446033 (June 15,
2004); I.R.S. Tech. Adv. Mem. 200437040 (June 7, 2004); I.R.S. Tech. Adv. Mem.
9635003 (Apr. 19, 1996); I.R.S. Tech. Adv. Mem. 9609007 (Dec. 6,1995); I.R.S. Tech.
Adv. Mem. 9117001 (Sept. 5, 1990); I.R.S. Priv. Ltr. Rul. 200602042 (Jan. 13, 2006);
I.R.S. Priv. Ltr. Rul. 9152039 (Sept. 30, 1991); I.R.S. Notice 94-111, 1994 I.R.B. 36;
I.R.S. Notice 88-76, 1988-2 C.B. 392; I.R.S. News Release I.R. 9623 (Apr. 24 1996);
I.R.S. Fact Sheet FS 2006-17 (Feb. 2006); Reilly & Allen, supra note 21; Ward L.
Thomas & Judith E. Kindell, Affiliations Among Political, Lobbying and Educational
Organizations, in IRS EXEMPT ORGANIZATIONS CONTINUING PROFESSIONAL
EDUCATION TECHNICAL INSTRUCTION PROGRAM FOR FISCAL YEAR 2000 (1999); see
also, Unpublished Tech. Adv. Mem. Tax Analysts Doc. No. 1999-5081 (regarding the
Progress and Freedom Foundation).
78 Rev. Rul. 2007-41, 2007-25 I.R.B. 1421 (June 18, 2007). The IRS's willingness
to commit itself to an enforcement paradigm by issuing a revenue ruling is notable.
While revenue rulings are not entitled to judicial deference in the way that regulations
would be, they are an official communication from the IRS stating its interpretation
of the application of the law to certain facts, and therefore can be taken as indicative
of its enforcement paradigm.
79 I call a view about the suitability of a candidate (positive or negative) that can
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interprets the Ban to prohibit activities that - under all the facts and
circumstances - communicate that the 501(c)(3) organization itself
supports one candidate over another.8 °
Under the Service's analysis, the court would have no problem
determining that the Church at Pierce Creek's advertisement violated
the Ban. The advertisement (1) identified a 501(c)(3) organization as
one of its "co-sponsors"; (2) was placed in major newspapers four
days before an election; (3) identified a candidate by name; (4)
described his policies as "in rebellion to God's laws;" and (5)
concluded with the call to action, "How then can we vote for Bill
Clinton?, 81 The language of the advertisement makes it relatively
clear (1) that the church itself (and not the minister or some affiliated
non-church organization acting on its own account) is the speaker; (2)
that the communication concerns a specific candidate for an election
(and not an issue); (3) that the advertisement communicates a clear
preference between the candidates (and is not neutrally presenting
information about the candidates); and (4) that the advertisement
communicates a view regarding how the reader should behave with
regard to the candidate (vote against him). What is egregious about
the advertisement under this "attribution" analysis is that the church
identifies itself as the speaker and it explicitly expresses an
unambiguous view about a candidate.
But what if the church attempted to use a non-501(c)(3) affiliate
organization to communicate its message, as is discussed in TWR and
Branch Ministries? Imagine that the advertisement had been paid for
by a 501(c)(4) or 527 affiliate of the Church and the request for
donations had stated "non-deductible donations for this
be attributed to an organization an "endorsement" herein, even though I am aware
that some commentators have attempted to reserve the word "endorsement" for
some "official" communication of an organization's choice of candidate in an election.
See, e.g., Samansky, supra note 9, at 178-79.
80 The Revenue Ruling contains twenty-one examples that are designed to
illustrate seven categories of questionable activities. With the exception of categories
five and four, which attempt to define the limits of what constitutes campaign
intervention itself, the categories all address the question of whether activities should
be attributed to the organization. The underlying principle is that if a preference
among candidates can be attributed to the organization, then the organization has
committed a prohibited campaign-intervention activity. The organization can only
avoid such prohibited activities by making sure that no view on the qualifications of
candidates can be attributed to it, generally by acting neutrally with regard to the
candidates.
81 Branch Ministries v. Rossotti, 40 F. Supp. 2d 15, 17 (D.D.C. 1999).
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advertisement gladly accepted. 82 Under that scenario, a reader who is
familiar with the law of tax-exempt organizations - or one who has
read TWR - would assume that the communication would be
permitted. Of course a non-501(c)(3) organization may take out an
advertisement urging voters to vote for or against a candidate for
813public office. That should not be controversial at all. But in the
context of the Service's current enforcement paradigm, the
hypothetical advertisement, even funded entirely by a non-501(c)(3)
organization and explicitly requesting non-deductible contributions,
would be a breach of the Campaign Intervention Ban.84 While the
Service has stated that it permits certain campaign-intervention
activities by a 501(c)(4) organization even if that organization had
been created by a 501(c)(3) organization and is affiliated with it, these
permissible activities do not include the communication of the
charity's views about candidates.85 From the Service's perspective, the
82 It is beyond the scope of this article to discuss whether the proper way to
structure an affiliation between a 501(c)(3) and a non-50(c)(3) organization is through
the use of a 501(c)(4) organization, a 527 organization, or some combination of the
two.
83 See supra notes 22-23 and accompanying text. At least two commentators
have proposed avoiding attribution problems by eschewing 501(c)(3) status and re-
organizing as either a 501(c)(4) organization or a taxable entity. See Cook, supra note
27; Hatfield, supra note 27.
84 The Revenue Ruling does not deal explicitly with a non-501(c)(3)
communicating a message that it expressly attributes to a 501(c)(3) organization, but
the Ruling's focus on attribution makes it possible to conclude that such behavior
would be prohibited. Rev. Rul. 2007-41, 2007-25 I.R.B. 1421. Interestingly, the only
discussion of collaboration between 501(c)(3) organizations and non-501(c)(3)
organizations is in Category six, which deals with so-called "business activity." This
section applies to "selling or renting of mailing lists, the leasing of office space, or the
acceptance of paid political advertising." Id. The Ruling specifies that in such
situations it is not sufficient for an organization to show that such services were
provided to a candidate for "a fee that is comparable to fees charged by other similar
organizations." Id. Rather, multiple factors must be examined with the goal of
determining if the organization is acting with complete neutrality as between
candidates. The implication is that recovering the cost is not the important issue -
attributing a preference to a 501(c)(3) organization is.
85 See supra note 7 and accompanying text; Treas. Reg. 1.501(c)(3)-1(c)(3)(iii)
(2008). Erika Lunder and L. Paige Whitaker summarized the Service's position with
regards to activities by charities as follows: "[in many situations, the activity is
permissible unless it is structured or conducted in such a way that shows bias towards
or against a candidate." ERIKA LUNDER AND L. PAIGE WHITAKER, CONG. RES. SERV.,
Order Code RL34447, CHURCHES AND CAMPAIGN AcrIvITY: ANALYSIS UNDER TAX
AND CAMPAIGN FINANCE LAWS, at CRS-3 (Apr. 14, 2008). In Thomas & Kindell,
supra note 72, at 264, the Service stated that the actions of a 501(c)(4) organization in
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advertisement would still breach the Ban because it identified The
Church at Pierce Creek as the author of the communication.8 And it
is immaterial whether any of the church's funds were used to pay for
it.
87
Under the Service's attribution paradigm, the affiliate-
organizations solution - which was essential to the Supreme Court's
holdings in TWR, Rust v. Sullivan and even Branch Ministries - is
arguably incapable of providing 501(c)(3) organizations with a
mechanism to engage in protected speech. 8 Thus, under the Service's
interpretation of the Ban a charity that wishes to engage in
conducting campaign-intervention activities would not be imputed to its 501(c)(3)
parent unless the 501(c)(4) uses the 501(c)(3)'s "resources or assets." However, the
guidance goes on to state that "[a]n important asset of an IRC 501(c)(3) organization
is the time of its officers and directors." Therefore, the guidance concludes, such
directors and officers should not direct the political campaign activities of the
501(c)(4) subsidiary. Even without the express prohibition on attributing speech to
the 501(c)(3) parent, this ban on direction would make it difficult or impossible for a
501(c)(4) to communicate on behalf of its 501(c)(3) parent, since the parent is
prohibited from acting through its directors to authorize the subsidiary to speak on its
behalf. As for section 527 organizations, the IRS has taken the position that "if [a
501(c)(3) organization creates a separate segregated fund under section 527 of the
Code and] the separate segregated fund conducts [campaign intervention] activities,
[such] activities will be imputed to [the section 501(c)(3) organization] and [the
organization's] exempt status as an organization described in section 501(c)(3) will be
revoked." I.R.S. Gen. Couns. Mem. 39,694 (Feb. 1, 1988). See, also, I.R.S. Tech. Adv.
Mem. 200446033 (Nov. 12, 2004) ("[section 501(c)(3) organizations] may not...
establish political action committees").
See Rev. Rul. 2007-41, 2007-25 I.R.B. 1421.
87 See Elizabeth J. Kingsley, Election-Year Activities - The Good, The Bad, and
the Vast Expanse of Gray, 19 TAX'N OF EXEMPTS 14, 14 (2008) (noting that "a
statement of endorsement, even if no expenditure is involved, will be considered
campaign intervention."). As discussed infra at Part V(B)(3), an attribution or
endorsement may inherently involve the expenditure of funds, since it implicates the
charity's "credibility."
Under the Service's attribution paradigm, a charity could possibly avoid
attribution problems if the advertisement attributed itself to a 501(c)(4) organization
that communicated its association with the charity, for example, by using the charity's
name in its own name. The Service has recently signaled its acceptance of certain
types of implicit attribution in the context of related organizations in order to comply
with the constitutional imperative stated in TWR. See Memorandum from Marsha
Ramirez, Dir., Exempt Orgs. Examinations, Dep't of the Treasury, to All EO
Revenue Agents, Political Campaign Activity on the Internet (July 28, 2008). But in
doing so, the Service is stretching its attribution paradigm far, in effect accepting
implicit attributions in certain contexts while arguing that attribution is generally a
facts and circumstances test. It is this confusion that the expenditure paradigm
advanced in this article seeks to avoid.
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constitutionally protected speech must forego 501(c)(3) status, and
thereby lose its ability to receive tax-deductible contributions, even
for charitable purposes. No court has held that forcing an organization
to give up its 501(c)(3) status entirely in order to engage in such
speech - even through an affiliate - is an adequate alternative
channel.' 9 That is because giving up 501(c)(3) status goes beyond what
is reasonably necessary to advance the legitimate government interest
in expenditure equity, and is therefore an "undue burden."
Thus, if the Service wants to enforce the Ban within constitutional
limits, it has a problem because all that is justified by the
government's interest in expenditure equity is prohibiting a 501(c)(3)
organization from using its own funds for campaign intervention. In
order to solve this problem, the Service would have to give up its
simple attribution analysis and ask a new question: were any of the
charity's funds used in a campaign-intervention communication?
V. "VALUATION" UNDER AN EXPENDITURE PARADIGM
To this point, I have discussed two propositions: (1) that the
Constitution requires that there be a legally permissible means for
501(c)(3) organizations to engage in campaign-intervention speech
without being forced to forgo entirely the benefits of 501(c)(3) tax
exemption; and (2) that the Service currently interprets the law in
such a way as to prohibit such speech by a 501(c)(3) organization,
even if funded by a non-501(c)(3) affiliate.
If these propositions are true, then the Service ought to adopt an
enforcement paradigm that avoids the constitutional problem, and to
do so, it must adopt some sort of expenditure paradigm.9° But given
Congress's obvious interest in advancing expenditure equity to the
fullest extent possible, the Service should try to adopt an enforcement
paradigm that ensures that no tax-deductible funds are used for
89 As discussed supra note 63, arguably the most burdensome statutory
framework the Court has ever approved is the "program integrity" regime in Rust v.
Sullivan, which required that governmentally-subsidized activities and non-subsidized
activities take place in separate places with separate employees. For the reasons
discussed supra note 63, I think such restrictions are not justified in the context of the
Ban.
90 Of course, Congress could make statutory changes to advance expenditure
equity goals without running afoul of the Constitution. The easiest way to do this
would be if Congress made all campaign intervention contributions, whether to
501(c)(3) organizations or directly to candidates, tax deductible. It would thereby
level the playing - so to speak - by making all campaign-intervention expenditures
made with pre-tax rather than post-tax dollars.
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campaign-intervention purposes. If the Service were to try to adopt an
enforcement paradigm that balanced these interests, it would face a
significant hurdle: preventing the expenditure of tax-deductible funds
requires the adoption of accounting procedures - really valuation
methods - to identify what constitutes an "expenditure" of funds for
campaign-intervention purposes. Anything less would under-serve
the government's interest in expenditure equity.
As discussed above, scholars have previously addressed the
affiliate organization solution, often pointing out that the Service's
attribution paradigm makes it impossible for organizations to use
affiliates to engage in campaign intervention.9' In addition,
commentators have generally not been enthusiastic about the use of
affiliates as a potential way to permit the government to pursue its
legitimate expenditure equity concerns while still permitting 501(c)(3)
organizations to engage in constitutionally protected speech. Part of
their hesitation may well originate in their concerns regarding the
valuation exercise that would be required to determine how much any
specific campaign intervention act "costs., 93 If it is legitimate to
91 See, e.g., Carroll, supra note 4, at 235 ("It is possible, moreover, that the
Treasury would attack the dual structure under the circumstances involved and move
to impute the campaign activity to the charity."); Chisolm, supra note 9, at 328 ("No
effective alternative avenues for nonsubsidized expression of campaign-related
political opinion are available to a section 501(c)(3) organization."); Hatfield, supra
note 27, at 146 (dismissing the affiliate organization solution because "the church's
pastor still would not be able to endorse a candidate from the pulpit"); Kemmitt,
supra note 9, at 173 ("[C]ommunications from the [affiliate] could not be
communications from the church itself."); Samansky, supra note 9, at 44 ("Formation
of a related organization, which the church might use for the dissemination of all
political statements, would typically not be a feasible option."); Totten, supra note 9,
at 314-15 ("This alternative, however, fails for at least two reasons ....").
Some commentators have focused on the administrative burdens of creating a
separate organization to fund campaign-intervention speech. See, e.g., Carroll, supra
note 4, at 235 ("Of course, even if the Service were to permit it, this would not be a
viable option for the vast majority of churches and other charitable groups, which
may have no reason or desire to create a section 501(c)(4) lobbying affiliate or no
prospect of raising sufficient nondeductible funds to support a separate
organization."). Some of these difficulties may be real (for example, campaign
intervention would necessarily involve accounting for campaign-intervention
expenditures and keeping accurate records), but some of the administrative
difficulties may be exaggerated or created by the attribution paradigm.
93 There are many examples of the abuse that exists in areas in which the Code
requires taxpayers to determine the value of property that is difficult to appraise, and
the Service's efforts to combat such abuse are often ineffective. For that reason, I
propose in my next section valuation safe harbors that could be promulgated by the
Service to avoid exactly that situation. But, for the reasons discussed herein, such safe
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insulate campaign intervention speech from the subsidy provided to
501(c)(3) organizations, then whatever method is used to determine
how much must be paid by the non-(c)(3) affiliate must be sufficient
to negate all of the subsidy.
A. Current Proposals Insufficiently Address Expenditure Equity:
De Minimis Solutions and Marginal Cost Theories
Current proposals offered by commentators or legislators either
fail to adopt an expenditure paradigm at all, or fail to advance a
method that sufficiently advances the interests of expenditure equity.
Some proposals are best described as de minimis solutions, in that
they carve out some specific types of campaign-intervention activities
that are viewed as least likely to permit the types of abuse that the
Ban is purported to be most concerned with.94 Many of these
proposals (notably, all of the proposals advanced by legislators except
one) apply only to churches, and leave all other 501(c)(3)
organizations without any solution.95
For example, The Religious Freedom Act of 2006 and 2007 would
permit churches unlimited campaign intervention speech if such
speech took place "in the theological or philosophical context of such
organization."9 The Houses of Worship Free Speech Restoration Act
of 2005 would permit churches to engage in campaign intervention
harbors should be theoretically linked to an adequate valuation analysis.
94 Although it has apparently moved away from such an analysis, the Service has
previously issued guidance that suggested that it would ignore de minimis violations
of the Ban. See, e.g., a discussion of such guidance in Carroll, supra note 4, at 240;
Klapach supra note 9, at 531-32. Some commentators have pointed out that the
current state of Service enforcement (at least until 2000) was so lax that it amounted
to - at best - the application of a de facto de minimis standard. See, e.g., Carroll,
supra note 4, at 227; Mayer, Grasping Smoke, supra note 64, at 4 (describing Service
enforcement as "spotty at best"), 14 (noting significant instances of noncompliance).
95 See supra note 11. De minimis theories that provide solutions only for
churches present potential constitutional issues of their own. It is beyond the scope of
this article to address Establishment Clause arguments against proposed solutions
that permit churches but not non-religious 501(c)(3) organizations to engage in
campaign intervention, but such arguments could be made. See, e.g., Ira C. Lupu,
Threading Between the Religion Clauses, 63 LAw & CONTEMP. PROBS. 439 (2000).
Even short of such arguments, solutions that carve out an exception for churches fail
to address the free speech concerns that plague non-religious 501(c)(3) organizations
by ignoring the political speech rights of all organizations.
Religious Freedom Act of 2007, S. 178, 110th Cong. (2007); Religious
Freedom Act of 2006, S. 3957, 109th Cong. (2006).
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speech "during religious services or gatherings." 97 The American Jobs
Creation Act of 2004 includes a provision that would permit churches
to engage in campaign intervention speech four times or less, so long
• 98
as such speech was unintentional. Other proposals have similarly
attempted to provide some room for churches to engage in campaign
intervention, so long as the amount and context were limited. 99
However, because these proposals permit campaign-intervention by
501(c)(3) organizations using tax-deductible funds, they fail to fully
address the concerns of expenditure equity, even if they permit only
limited amounts of intervention and only by specific types of
organizations.
Other commentators have adopted what could be called
"marginal cost" paradigms. A marginal cost is one that would not
have been incurred but for campaign intervention motives. For
example, if a church took out an advertisement decrying Bill Clinton's
policies, and urging the public to vote against him, the fees paid to the
newspaper are marginal costs. The postage to send the advertisement
copy to the newspaper is a marginal cost. The salary of the minister or
church employee who wrote the advertisement is not a marginal cost
because the salary would have been paid in the same amount whether
the employee had written the advertisement or not. Some
commentators have argued that campaign-intervention should be
permitted when no marginal, "incremental" or "third party" costs are
97 Houses of Worship Free Speech Restoration Act of 2005, H.R. 235, 109th
Cong. (2005).
98 American Jobs Creation Act of 2004, H.R. 4520, 108th Cong. § 692 (as
introduced in the House, June 4, 2004).
99 See generally, legislative proposals cited supra note 11. See also, Buckles,
Peep, supra note 9, at 1108-09 (proposing that "independently controlled charities"
be permitted to make unlimited campaign expenditures and that non-independent
charities be permitted to make "any oral communication made primarily between an
organization and its members in person"); Totten, supra note 9, at 321-23 (arguing
that oral communications at church gatherings should be permitted); Ellen Aprill,
Letter to Various Government Officials Dated November 29, 2005 (stating that "it is
better to err on the side of allowing rather than denying political speech" and
proposing four safe harbors for (1) discussions that do not refer to specific policies;
(2) statements by an individual made with a disclaimer that the person is not speaking
for the organization; (3) statements that do not identify a candidate; and (4)
statements made outside an election cycle).
0 For a systematic discussion of why de minimis solutions violate principles of
tax fairness, see generally Richard J. Wood, Pious Politics: Political Speech Funded
Through I. R. C. §501(c) (3) Organizations Examined Under Tax Fairness Principles, 39
ARIZ. ST. L.J. 209 (2007).
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incurred. 01 Others have proposed that the law be changed to permit
campaign intervention under certain limited circumstances, so long as
no marginal costs are incurred.
02
For example, Allan Samansky recently argued that churches (but
not other 501(c)(3) organizations) should be encouraged to
participate in the electoral system as an "effective counterweight to
moneyed interests that try to influence the voting public."10 3  He
proposes that "churches and religious leaders should have virtually
101 See, e.g., Caron & Dessingue, supra note 30, at 193 (discussing the "additional
cost incurred as a result of what the IRS might characterize as 'political activity' in a
sermon"); Feld, supra note 9, at 938 ("if the church spends no funds to promote the
candidate and the use of its property incurs only nominal expense, the activity
arguably does not entail the expenditure of tax-subsidized dollars in the political
campaign"); Kemmitt, supra note 9, at 177 (arguing that if only expenditures were
banned, "[c]andidate endorsements from the pulpit would be clearly permissible");
Elizabeth J. Kingsley, Praise the Lord and Pass the Voter Guides, 18 TAX'N OF
EXEMPTS 278 (2007) ("A limited exception for religious speech where there is no
measurable expenditure of funds has the strong appeal of taking the tax man out of
the pulpit."); see also, I.R.S. Priv. Ltr. Rul. 200446033 (June 14, 2004) (in which the
IRS rejected - by ignoring - the taxpayer's argument that no expenditure had been
made by a 501(c)(3) organization because all "incremental" costs had been
reimbursed by a section 527 organization created by a section 501(c)(6) affiliate of the
501(c)(3) organization); I.R.S. Priv. Ltr. Rul. 96-09-007 (Dec. 6, 1995) (holding that
because a fund raising letter constitutes campaign intervention, "[a]t the least, the
cost of publishing and distribution of the subject letters, and related incidental
expenses, are political expenditures as defined in section 4955(d)(1)" without
discussing the impact of the fact that the letter was sent out by a for-profit fundraising
firm, which bore the costs described above in exchange for a percentage of the funds
raised).
102 Commentators who propose adopting the categories and definitions from
campaign-finance law are, in effect, arguing for a "marginal cost" definition of
political expenditures, even if they are not conscious of it. See, e.g., Ablin, supra note
9, at 583-84; Chisolm, supra note 9, at 362; see also, Kemmitt, supra note 9; Mayer,
Grasping Smoke, supra note 64, at n. 5 (discussing the proposals of others). A
discussion of how expenditures are defined, and therefore what is permitted and
prohibited under FECA's "ban" on corporate expenditures, is beyond the scope of
this article. However, a discussion of how the standards enforced by the FEC interact
with those enforced by the Service can be found in Lloyd H. Mayer, The Much
Maligned 527 and Institutional Choice, 87 B.U. L. REV. 625 (2007) [Hereinafter,
Mayer, Choice]; Elizabeth J. Kingsley & John Pomeranz, A Crash at the Crossroads:
Tax and Campaign Finance Laws Collide in Regulation of Political Activities of Tax-
Exempt Organizations, 31 WM. MITCHELL L. REV. 55 (2004); Ezra W. Reese, The
Other Agency: The Impact of Recent Federal Law Enforcement on Nonprofit Political
Activity, 58 EXEMPT ORG. TAX REV. 131 (2007).
103 Samansky, supra note 9, at 150.
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complete freedom to communicate with their congregations, ' ° but
that communications to non-members should continue to be
absolutely prohibited. 05 Expenditures for campaign intervention that
would not have been made but for campaign intervention motives are
still completely prohibited under Samansky's proposal.'
6
While it is intuitively appealing to suppose that no expenditure is
made unless an incremental cost is incurred, a marginal cost theory is
insufficient to account for the benefit obtained by a 501(c)(3)
organization on account of its receipt of subsidized funds. 07 That is
because an organization may use expenditures made with subsidized
funds to support its campaign-intervention activities, but without
making any marginal expenditure. For example, if an organization
uses subsidized funds to engage in certain activities, and those
104 Id. at 165.
105 Interestingly, Samansky argues that the only limitation regarding "sermons
and routine communications" should be that no "official endorsement" should be
permitted, since the purpose of endorsements is allegedly to communicate the
church's views to outsiders. See Samansky, supra note 9, at 166. Unfortunately,
stopping short of permitting endorsements potentially prevents Samansky's proposal
from resolving the constitutional concerns. If the constitutional analysis suggested in
this article is correct, then it is at the heart of the First Amendment protection that an
entity be permitted to communicate its own views on candidates, and that is exactly
what an official endorsement is. Thus, solutions that stop short of permitting a
501(c)(3) organization from making an endorsement (even an "official" endorsement)
do not resolve the constitutional issue. See also, James, supra note 9, at 410
(proposing that Congress amend the Code to permit small churches to engage in
campaign intervention with funds raised specifically for those purposes, but
continuing to argue that such churches be permitted to endorse candidates only "at
non-religious events").
106 See Samansky, supra note 9, at 165 (campaign-intervention activities
prohibited if they "involve a direct expenditure of funds").
107 Chris Kemmitt has recently proposed focusing on expenditures, but seems to
have implicitly adopted a marginal cost method of identifying such expenditures. See
Kemmitt, supra note 9, at 176-77. His proposal has therefore been criticized for
treating as free, and therefore permitting, activities like "[c]andidate endorsements
from the pulpit." Wood, supra note 100, at 229. Wood argues that such endorsements
potentially involve "three specific and discrete expenses" (space, media, and speaker
salary). Id. Likewise, Johnny Rex Buckles calls Kemmitt's proposal to ban only
"incremental" costs problematic since "the proposal is ambiguous, and quite possibly
unworkable." Buckles, Peep, supra note 9, at 1099 n.136. But notwithstanding his
criticism of Kemmitt, Buckles proposes that "non-independent" charities be
prohibited only from making campaign-intervention expenditures, without exploring
what would constitute an expenditure. See Buckles, Peep, supra note 9, at Appendix.
See, also, Feld, supra note 9, at 939 (arguing that "[flocus on the use of funds seems
warranted, to prevent the diversion of government subsidy from exempt purposes to
political activity" but assuming that a church endorsement is free).
708 Virginia Tax Review [Vol. 28:673
activities serve both campaign-intervention and non-campaign-
intervention purposes, the fact that the campaign intervention
activities produce no increased marginal costs do not negate the
effects of the subsidy. Therefore, "marginal cost" theories or
proposals are inadequate to serve as the basis for a regulatory
paradigm that fully advances the government's interest in expenditure
equity.
B. A Sufficient Theory Must Account for Allocation
of Expenditures that Advance Campaign-Intervention Objectives
1. Allocation of Costs
If the various marginal cost and de minimis theories are
insufficient to account for the full benefit received by 501(c)(3)
organizations on account of the deductibility of donations, a sufficient
theory would ensure that no funds obtained on a tax-deductible basis
were used for campaign-intervention purposes. In effect, such a theory
must provide a means to value "costs" associated with the campaign-
intervention and non-campaign-intervention aspects of shared
activities, so that the correct proportion of shared expenditures
related to such activities could be allocated between the two aspects.
When such allocation accounting has been performed, then the
organization(s) could ensure that campaign-intervention expenditures
were paid for by the non-501(c)(3) affiliate organization.
As discussed above, the challenges of an adequate cost allocation
theory can be illustrated by thinking about the example of a minister
endorsing a candidate during a regularly-scheduled worship service in
a 501(c)(3) church.'O' Commentators have noted that when a minister
communicates an endorsement, his or her salary is paying for both
campaign-intervention and non-campaign-intervention activities.1°9
108 This article focuses on actual endorsements to avoid discussing the border
between campaign-intervention and non-campaign-intervention activities, which are
beyond the scope of this article. But, of course, a minister's words at a regularly-
scheduled worship service could constitute campaign intervention even if such words
were not an outright endorsement. If the words constituted campaign-intervention,
then the analysis that applies to an endorsement would apply equally.
109 This type of cost allocation has enough intuitive appeal that it has been
advocated, at least implicitly, by several commentators on the Ban, although no one
has attempted to describe a method by which such allocation should be made. See,
e.g., Carroll, supra note 4, at 235 ("ITjhe clergy.., should be able to comment from
the pulpit.., or speak out for or against candidates as long as their compensation ...
and any other associated expenses are paid from the [non-501(c)(3)] affiliate's
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But even something as seemingly simple as allocating the cost of the
minister's paid time would potentially involve numerous decisions and
calculations. The first decision would be whether to treat all of the
minister's time equally, or whether to treat the time he spends actually
speaking to his congregation as more (or less) valuable than time he
spends counseling, teaching, studying or anything else his or her job
entails. Assuming that it is reasonable to treat all time equally, then
one would need to tally up all his time, divide by his salary and
benefits and calculate the amount of time spent delivering his
message,110 researching and preparing that message, and consulting
with lawyers and accountants about the tax implications of the speech.
The resulting cost under such an analysis would likely be small. The
proper share of other current expenditures, like publicity, space
rental, and the cost of consultants may also have to be allocated.
Some commentators have offered the opinion that "shared"
activities, like political speech in a sermon, must be completely
banned or entirely permitted because of "severability" problems.
They argue that a communication from a minister in her sermon
cannot be "separated" into the words of the 501(c)(3) church and the
income .... ); Chisolm, supra note 9, at 358 n.216 ("Of course, expenses would have
to be properly allocated."); Totten, supra note 9, at 322 ("Of course, almost any oral
or written communication made by a religious leader who draws a paycheck from the
congregation conceivably carries a price tag."); Wood, supra note 100, at 237 ("While
a 501(c)(3) religious organization might own its own broadcasting facilities and
equipment, their cost can still be allocated among the individual uses to which the
facilities or equipment are put .... [This can be done through] detailed amortization
schedules for church-owned media assets plus allocation of personnel and overhead
expenses.").
110 In determining the length of time devoted to delivering the message, one
would have to decide whether an entire sermon in which an endorsement has been
made is at issue, or whether the portion of the sermon devoted to actually endorsing
the candidate can be separated out. In I.R.S. Priv. Ltr. Rul. 200437060 (June 7, 2004),
the Service found that a broadcast by a 501(c)(3) church constituted campaign
intervention, and it imposed the section 4955 excise tax on the marginal costs
associated with the entire broadcast. Similarly, in its investigation of the NAACP, the
Service requested an accounting of the total of the expenditures made for the
convention at which the allegedly campaign-intervention speech was made. Lloyd
Mayer, who represented the NAACP, concluded that it was planning to consider all
expenditures made to hold the convention as "expenditures" for the purposes of
calculating excise taxes, rather than just that portion of the convention during which
the speech at issue was made. See Mayer, Grasping Smoke, supra note 64, at 38
nn.129-30 and accompanying text. Richard Wood has argued that not only the time
spent giving the sermon should be considered, but also expenses associated with any
entertainment given at the service at which an endorsement is made. See Wood,
supra note 100, at 237-38.
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words of its non-501(c)(3) affiliate."' When a minister speaks at a
sermon, her words are essentially unitary, and it is meaningless to
separate them between campaign-intervention and non-campaign-
intervention categories. As a hermeneutic matter, this may well be
true. The arguments the minister makes about what God commands
in terms of moral action may be unitary and flow inexorably from a
single source, whether the command is to love one's neighbor or to
vote for John McCain. Likewise, it may be meaningless for the
minister to try to attribute the two components (campaign intervention
and non-campaign-intervention) to different sources. And, in fact, the
Service has taken the position that the words of a minister at an
"official" function of a 501(c)(3) organization will be attributed to the
501(c)(3) organization no matter what the minister says or does.112 So,
from an attribution perspective, certain activities may well be
"inseparable."
But if the question is not attribution but allocation, then
arguments about "inseparability" make less sense. If one assumes that
campaign-intervention words cannot be separated from non-
campaign-intervention words within any single act of discourse (like a
sermon) but that they can be separated from linked ideas expressed in
separate discourses, then the hermeneutic problem is solved. More
importantly, so long as an adequate allocation method can be
developed, the mechanics of allocation should not be challenging.
Allocation by definition means separating a single expenditure into
component parts. For example, imagine that one concluded that the
salary of the minister had to be allocated between campaign-
II See Buckles, Reply, supra note 9, at 1105 ("[A] pastor carries the pulpit with
him wherever he goes .... "); Caron & Dessingue, supra note 30, at 193 ("The utility
of this approach, however, depends on the severability of the Exempt Organization's
[political] activities. Certain church activities that may be characterized by the IRS as
political activity are not severable, e.g., teaching and preaching functions that
normally take place during worship services .... There is no practical means by which
[these activities] can be delegated to a section 501(c)(4) affiliate."); Klapach, supra
note 9, at 515 ("[Tlhe severance of political expression from a religious organization's
otherwise exempt activities would be impossible when a religious leader gives a
sermon or other religious instruction."); Ryan, supra note 30, at 90-91 ("However, it
is not possible to segregate sources of funding when a religious organization adopts a
position that it will not distribute communion to members who vote in a particular
way.").
1 The Service has taken the position that it is impossible for a minister to
effectively attribute his speech to anything other than the 501(c)(3) organization if he
is speaking at an "official" function of the organization. See Rev. Rul. 2007-41, 2007-1
C.B. 1421.
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intervention and non-campaign-intervention purposes, and imagine
that one had developed a method for reasonably allocating. Once the
allocation was complete, the actual mechanism of paying from
separate sources - one a 501(c)(3) and one a non-501(c)(3) - can be
accomplished either by having each organization cut the minister a
check for his salary, or, if it is easier, for the minister to receive his
salary from one source (say, the 501(c)(3) organization), which would
then be reimbursed by the other. This reimbursement method would
presumably be possible for any of the costs that should properly be
allocated between organizations. Determining the amount of
reimbursement is not a simple matter, but accomplishing the
mechanics of reimbursement can be simple indeed. It is just a matter
of accounting. " '
2. The General Problem of "Capital Assets"
If allocating readily identifiable costs, like the speaker's salary, is
complicated, there are other potential costs that are even more
difficult to allocate, some of which may not be immediately apparent.
Take, for example, time spent by volunteers. The Service has
commented that the time of an organization's (presumably volunteer)
board is an "important asset.""14 On the one hand, to the degree that a
volunteer's actions cost nothing to the organization, no tax-deductible
funds have been expended. And, after all, a person is permitted to
volunteer directly with a candidate to benefit his or her campaign.
From the perspective of expenditure equity, it appears that there is no
justification for prohibiting a person from providing volunteer service
to his or her church, which is then used to benefit a candidate.
Volunteering through a church instead of individually does not appear
to "tilt" the campaign-finance playing field.
But that analysis is only true to the degree that no tax-deductible
funds have been expended in connection with the volunteer's actions.
While the time of volunteers may not involve any "direct" costs, like
salary, there may be costs associated with volunteers' association with
the organization nonetheless. For example, the organization has
113 As is discussed infra at Part V(B)(2) and (3), the ability of non-501(c)(3)
organizations to reimburse 501(c)(3) for costs incurred in the past is important to
imagining how certain "hidden costs" discussed infra could be allocated. For a
discussion of the mechanics of reimbursement, see Elizabeth J. Kingsley, Shared
Payroll Considerations in Structuring Cost-Sharing Arrangements, 19 TAX'N OF
EXEMPTS 43 (2007).
114 See Thomas & Kindell, supra note 77, at 264.
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presumably spent money in the past to gather volunteers together, to
organize them, and to communicate with them. These expenditures
were presumably made with tax-deductible contributions. In this way,
an organization's volunteers may constitute a sort of "hidden" capital
asset, in that expenditures may have been made over time to create or
enhance their value to the organization. Even though the organization
doesn't pay them anything, it has invested in the past in their
- • • 115
acquisition and cultivation. Because the organization has used tax-
deductible contributions to acquire and cultivate its volunteers, an
argument could be made that the principles of expenditure equity are
violated when volunteers of a 501(c)(3) organization are used for
campaign-intervention activities. But what is less clear is how an
organization could identify the proper allocative share of these
historic expenditures in order to ensure that a non-501(c)(3)'s funds
are used to reimburse the 501(c)(3) for such expenditures.
Other, more recognizable, capital assets may also be implicated in
the campaign-intervention activities of 501(c)(3) organizations. For
example, when a minister intervenes in a campaign during a worship
service, the building in which the worship service takes place may be
implicated. The building may have been purchased many years ago.
For tax and accounting purposes, the church building may have been
fully depreciated long ago. The remaining "cost" (really, cost basis) in
the building may be zero. But still, at some point the church
presumably used tax-deductible contributions to build or acquire the
building. Permitting the organization (or its affiliate) to use it for free
arguably violates the policy of expenditure equity. Thus, it appears
that an adequate expenditure method would include some method of
allocating both the current and the capital expenditures that support
campaign-intervention activities.
3. The Allocation of the Cost of an Organization's "Credibility"
In this article, I have argued that the Service's attribution
paradigm fails to limit the Ban to constitutional parameters. But that
is not to say that the Service's intuition that attribution is important is
15 An even more concrete example of this type of "asset," is the membership or
mailing list of an organization. The organization may have spent almost nothing
specifically to compile it, but in some ways all the charitable activities that the
organization has done (using tax-deductible contributions) are drawn upon in the
creation of the list. These lists have been identified by politicians as having significant
value, and the Service has directly addressed their proper treatment under section
501 (c)(3). See Rev. Rul. 2007-41, 2007-1 C.B. 1421.
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misguided. Indeed, an argument could be made that the identity of the
speaker of campaign-intervention speech is central to its proper
treatment under an expenditure paradigm. This argument proceeds
from the observation that the effectiveness - and therefore value -
of campaign-intervention speech may be directly linked to the identity
of its speaker. Indeed, the very concept of an "endorsement"
presupposes that the listener cares more about the credibility of the
speaker than the content of the argument such speaker makes on
behalf of a candidate. If the Service's position is that attribution is the
key to campaign-intervention speech, then the question is whether
this position can be incorporated into an expenditure paradigm so that
the Ban can be enforced within constitutional parameters.
If an organization's building is a tangible example of a "capital"
asset that may be implicated in a cost allocation method that attempts
to accurately reflect the interests of expenditure equity, and its
membership may be an example of a less tangible example, one could
argue that the identity of the speaker gives rise to an even more
abstract example of a capital asset. Whenever a view on a candidate
can be attributed to an organization, the organization's credibility is
implicated. An argument could be made that subsidized expenditures
made by an organization over its entire history have served on some
basis to enhance its credibility. Whatever it has spent its money on,
that money has served to enhance the perceived legitimacy of the
organization among its constituency. When it makes an endorsement,
the organization draws upon this history of legitimacy.'
16
116 This "legitimacy" factor could be thought of in more familiar terms. It is
generally accepted that an operating business is usually more valuable than the sum of
the value of its operating assets. This excess value is usually attributed to a series of
factors that defy easy valuation, often thrown together as "goodwill." Goodwill may
include such intangible assets as the value of certain business processes and the value
of the business's supply and distribution networks. But at least one component of
goodwill (the one from which it gets its name) is the favorable impression among
customers and suppliers that a business has created through its years of existence.
This component of goodwill may be understood as the value of a business's "brand"
or "name." Thomas and Kindell identify "goodwill" and "name" as organizational
"assets" of a 501(c)(3) organization. See Thomas & Kindell, supra note 77, at 261. To
the best of my knowledge, the only scholar to explicitly recognize the value of the
goodwill of an endorser is Johnny Rex Buckles, Peep, supra note 9, at 1098 n.135. The
idea was first suggested to the author in conversation with Calvin Johnson. Others
have arguably implicitly recognized such value. See, e.g., Samansky, supra note 9, at
176 ("The cost of publishing [an endorsement] on the internet or sending a letter to
parishioners is trivial relative to its effect. The impact of the message would be
unaffected [by attribution to a non-501(c)(3) affiliate] because the Bishop's authority
would still be behind it.").
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For example, if the Nature Conservancy spends the majority of its
money preserving endangered lands, fighting for environmental
causes, and raising the awareness of the public about environmental
issues, then all or most of the money it spends on these activities is
implicated when it makes an endorsement. The fact that it has
conducted those other activities over the years with "subsidized"
funds means that it has an unfair advantage when it finally decides to
make an endorsement. In the popular parlance, it has spent years
building "cultural capital," which it now "spends" for a campaign
intervention purpose. If it has used subsidized funds to build its
cultural capital, an expenditure equity problem has been created,
unless the expenditure paradigm can account for the funds expended
in creating such cultural capital.
It is conceivable that this issue is at the heart of the suspicion with
which some commentators view campaign intervention by 501(c)(3)
organizations. To the degree to which it seems impossible to
formulate a theory (much less a method) by which a cost-allocation
method would adequately account for the cost of creating a 501(c)(3)
organization's credibility, an expenditure method seems doomed to
undervalue campaign intervention by 501(c)(3) organizations."7
This very brief discussion of the valuation problems inherent in
crafting a regulatory paradigm adequate to meet the demands of
expenditure equity has led to a few conclusions. First, expenditure
equity requires that a valuation theory that is adequate to provide the
basis for a reimbursement or cost-sharing regimen must attempt to
track expenditures that have potentially been made with subsidized
funds. Neither a de minimis nor a marginal cost theory can do that.
Second, costs that are material to the analysis may be hard to identify.
Finally, an argument could be made that costs (or a portion of those
costs) associated with building an organization's credibility might be
117 In addition to the effect of the subsidy provided to 501(c)(3) organizations
through the deductibility of contributions, there is an argument to be made that the
Code - by setting certain organizations apart and permitting them to use the name
"501(c)(3)" - provides a subsidy to the charitable sector in general. Lloyd Mayer has
discussed the "halo effect," which he describes as the "disproportionate electoral
effect" a charity may enjoy "because of the goodwill charities generally enjoy."
Mayer, Grasping Smoke, supra note 64, at 22. If the confidence placed in charities by
the public is due (at least in part) to the regulatory apparatus that defines the actions
permissible to charities, then it is possible to argue that this halo effect is created
through a subsidy provided by the Code, but distinct from the subsidy provided by
deductibility of donations. See also, Klapach, supra note 9, at 505 ("Knowing that the
IRS monitors tax-exempt charities and that it will impose serious sanctions for a
charity's misdeeds assures contributors of a charity's legitimacy.").
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implicated in an expenditure analysis that truly maximized the
government's interest in expenditure equity. Thus, despite Justice
Scalia's view that "one need not consult a CPA" to perform an
allocative cost analysis,' 8 it is clear from the discussion above that
finding a theoretically justifiable paradigm for such an allocation
method may be difficult indeed.
What then should the Service do? If the constitutional analysis
described herein is correct, then the Service needs to change its
enforcement paradigm to permit some mechanism by which 501(c)(3)
organizations can engage in campaign-intervention speech. If it wants
to advance the government's interest in expenditure equity, it needs to
recognize a method to do so that prevents funds raised on a tax-
deductible basis from being used for such activities. The next section
attempts to lay out two approaches that the Service may take to better
match its enforcement of the Ban to the expenditure equity concerns
that justify it, without becoming paralyzed by the practical problems
of creating a perfect match.
VI. PROPOSED SOLUTIONS: MODELS
FOR AN EXPENDITURE PARADIGM
As I have pointed out, a de minimis rule is insufficient as a means
of providing a sound theoretical basis for an enforcement paradigm by
the Service. But that is not to say that the Service does not have
significant latitude in crafting its guidance. So long as there is some
mechanism that permits 501(c)(3) organizations from engaging in
campaign-intervention activities without being "unduly burdensome,"
the Service may well avoid the constitutional problem. 9 In order to
advance the government's interest in expenditure equity, however, the
Service should try to prevent, as much as possible, the use of goods or
services that have been paid for with tax-deductible contributions for
campaign-intervention activities.
18 Hein v. Freedom From Religion Found., Inc., 127 S. Ct. 2553, 2581 n.4 (Scalia,
J., concurring) (2007).
19 If a government agency must miss the mark in perfectly balancing the
constitutional right to speech with a compelling governmental interest, First
Amendment jurisprudence generally holds that it should err on the side of too much,
not too little, protection of speech. See, e.g., FEC v. Wis. Right to Life, Inc., 127 S. Ct.
2652 (2007). Therefore, the Service need not hit the nail exactly on the head, although
it should craft its regulatory paradigm to miss the mark at the expense of expenditure
equity and not speech.
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Above all, the Service needs to issue guidance that makes it
possible for organizations to engage in protected speech while steering
clear of prohibited activities. Thus, first, the Service should issue
guidance that explains that, contrary to its prior position, attribution
of campaign-intervention speech to a 501(c)(3) organization is not
sufficient to constitute a breach of the Ban. Rather, the Ban prohibits
only campaign-intervention expenditures by 501(c)(3) organizations.
Second, the guidance should make it clear that a 501(c)(3)
organization that wishes to engage in campaign-intervention activities
may use non-501(c)(3) affiliates to fund such activities. Third, the
Service should make clear that the concept of "expenditures" includes
more than just those incremental costs identifiable under a marginal
cost theory. Thus, allocations and reimbursements may be required,
and such allocations or reimbursements must be made based on a
reasonable method. Fourth, the Service should provide one or more
safe harbor methods for reasonable allocation.
This section contains two proposals for such a safe-harbor
reasonable allocation method: one that attempts to provide a
workable method for allocating expenditures of 501(c)(3)
organizations and a second that attempts to graft onto that method an
attempt to take into account expenditures made that have enhanced
an organization's credibility. Both are simplifying methods that the
Service could adopt as safe-harbors, presumptively constituting a
reasonable allocation. The first is to model the allocation method on
an existing one: the rules for allocating lobbying expenditures found in
Treas. Reg. 1.162-28. This method has the benefit of being potentially
familiar to taxpayers and to the Service, but - especially if
endorsements are "capital intensive" activities - it has the weakness
of potentially undervaluing the acts of 501(c)(3) organizations (and
therefore insufficiently advancing the goals of expenditure equity).
The second proposes a safe harbor for valuing speech by a 501(c)(3)
organization that is wholly new. This second proposal is an attempt to
address the argument that an organization's endorsement is much
more valuable than would be calculated under the first simplification
method. But this proposal has the weakness of being largely arbitrary
in its valuation method.
120 Many scholars (as well presumably as most charities) would favor some sort of
bright-line rule. For an example, see Mayer, Grasping Smoke, supra note 64, at 31-36.
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A. Allocation Using the Methods Approved
Under Treasury Regulations 1.162-28
As discussed above, the concept of expenditure equity assumes
that taxpayers other than 501(c)(3) organizations are not able to make
deductible campaign-intervention expenditures."' And, in fact, the
Code generally denies taxpayers the ability to deduct expenditures
made for campaign intervention. For example, taxpayers engaged in a
trade or business may not deduct campaign-intervention expenditures,
even if such expenditures would otherwise be permitted as an
122ordinary and necessary business expense . If expenditure equity
seeks to treat taxpayers alike with regard to campaign-intervention
expenditures, then it would be logical for the non-deductibility of
business taxpayers' campaign-intervention expenditures to provide a
model for the non-deductibility of charities' campaign-intervention
. 123
expenditures.
Unfortunately, there is no guidance from the Service about how a
business should determine which of its expenses are for campaign-
intervention purposes or how to allocate expenses between campaign-
intervention and non-campaign-intervention purposes. However, the
Treasury Department has adopted regulations in a closely analogous
area. In addition to making campaign-intervention expenditures non-
deductible, the Code currently denies taxpayers the ability to deduct
most lobbying expenditures, even if such expenditures would
otherwise be deductible as business expenses. In the lobbying
context, Treasury Regulations have been adopted that require that at
121 See supra at note 29 and accompanying text.
1 See I.R.C. § 162(e)(1)(B) ("No deduction shall be allowed ... for any amount
paid or incurred in connection with ... participation in, or intervention in, any
political campaign on behalf of (or in opposition to) any candidate for public office").
123 As discussed supra note 102, several commentators have proposed limiting the
Ban to instances in which an "expenditure" has been made under federal campaign
finance law. A full discussion of the definition of campaign activity under the FECA,
2 U.S.C. §§ 431-57, is beyond the scope of this article, but suffice it to say that limiting
the Ban to activities currently prohibited to corporations and labor unions under
FECA would be significantly more permissive even than using section 162(e) as a
model. It would also be logical to use as a model the allocation rules promulgated for
use with the excise tax for excess lobbying by charities under section 4911 of the
Internal Revenue Code. See Treas. Reg. § 56.4911-3 (1990). Applying these rules
would produce a more permissive allocation methodology as well, which would
therefore serve the interests of expenditure equity less fully than rules modeled on
Treas. Reg. § 1.162-28 (1995).
124 See I.R.C. § 162(e)(1)(A).
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least certain expenditures made for both lobbying and ordinary
business purposes be allocated between the two uses according to a
reasonable method. 125 Despite differences in both context and subject
matter, it is logical to attempt to adapt these regulations to the
Service's need to find an adequate method for allocating expenditures
of a 501(c)(3) organization between campaign-intervention and non-
campaign-intervention purposes. Having gone through the formal
process by which federal regulations are adopted, they reflect the
reasoned opinion of the Treasury Department about proper allocation
methods for a closely related purpose.
It is worth noting that the provision relating to lobbying
expenditures has a generous statutory de minimis exception, which
permits a taxpayer to deduct up to $2,000 of "in house expenditures"
in any year (so long as such expenditures would otherwise be
deductible as an ordinary and necessary business expense). 126 "In
house" expenditures include any expenditure other than those paid to
professional lobbyists or as dues to organizations that engage in
lobbying on behalf of the taxpayer.1 27 Notably, the Code provides that
"[i]n determining whether a taxpayer exceeds the $2,000 limit under
this clause, there shall not be taken into account overhead costs
otherwise allocable to [lobbying] activities.' ' 128 In other words, so long
as a taxpayer does not hire a lobbyist, and so long as expenditures
made to third parties for lobbying purposes do not exceed $2,000, a
taxpayer may deduct both its third-party payments and all of its
overhead expenses that were incurred for lobbying purposes. In this
context, the deduction of "overhead" expenses presumably means
that no allocation would be necessary for the types of "shared"
expenditures discussed above in section V(B)(1), like salaries, much
less any of the less obvious costs discussed above in sections V(B)(2)
and (3). Thus, in the language adopted in this article, the statutory de
minimis exception adopts a marginal cost method for measuring
expenditures, and permits unlimited activity, so long as the marginal
cost of all such activity is less than $2,000 (and so long as professional
lobbyists are not hired). This de minimis exception provides the
opportunity for an organization to deduct the cost of quite a lot of
lobbying activities, so long as its payments to third parties are modest.
For the reasons discussed above, such a generous de minimis
125 See Treas. Reg. § 1.162-28. These allocation rules apply to lobbying activities,
not campaign-intervention activities.
126 See I.R.C. § 162(e)(5)(B).
127 See I.R.C. § 162(e)(5)(B)(ii).
1S I.R.C. § 162(e)(5)(B)(i).
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exception would not fully advance the government's interest in
expenditure equity, and so a solution that adopted it would not solve
the problem posed in this article.
However, if the statutory de minimis exception is ignored, there is
the possibility that the section 1.162-28 Regulations could be used as a
model for enforcement of the Ban. If an organization does not fall
within the statutory de minimis exception, then in addition to being
barred from deducting its third-party expenditures that exceed $2,000,
the taxpayer must allocate certain overhead costs between lobbying
and non-lobbying purposes. 129 These allocable overhead costs
expressly include salaries under the subcategory "labor costs," as well
as less obvious expenditures such as "depreciation, rent, utilities,
insurance, maintenance costs... and other administrative department
costs," under the subcategory of "[g]eneral and administrative
costs."3°
Generally, the Regulations hold that any reasonable method may
be employed to allocate costs between lobbying and non-lobbying
activities, but they also provide three simplified methods that a
taxpayer may use to avoid the complication of devising its own
reasonable method."' For example, a taxpayer may use the "ratio"
method, under which the taxpayer creates a ratio, the numerator of
which is the total amount of "lobbying labor hours" and the
denominator is "total labor hours." This ratio is then multiplied by the
company's "total cost of operation." The sum is then added to "third-
party costs" to reach total lobbying expenditures for the taxpayer for
the year. 32 In other words, under the ratio method, non-third-party
costs are determined as a flat ratio based entirely on employee hours
devoted to lobbying activities.'33 It is notable that "total cost of
129 Treas. Reg. § 1.162-28(c).
130 Id.
131 See Treas. Reg. §§ 1.162-28(d), (e), (f). See generally, T.D. 8602, 1995-2 C.B.
15.
132 See Treas. Reg. § 1.162-28(d)(1). Third-party costs are loosely analogous to
those costs that would be considered under a "marginal cost" method, as discussed
supra Part V(A).
133 The Regulations provide an additional de minimis exception that applies to
the calculation of the number of employee hours devoted to lobbying activities. In
calculating the amount of time employees collectively spend on lobbying activities,
any employee who spends less than five percent of her time on lobbying does not
have to be counted, in effect permitting the taxpayer to round such employees'
lobbying time down to zero, see Treas. Reg. § 1.162-28(g)(1), with the caveat that any
time spent by an employee on "direct contact lobbying" (speaking directly to
lawmakers) cannot be rounded down to zero. See Treas. Reg. § 1.162-28(g)(2). This
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operations" includes just what it says, and therefore would
presumably include capital expenditures and any expenditure made to
build an organization's credibility.
The ratio method, like the other two methods discussed in the
Regulations, provides a simplified way of dividing a taxpayer's total
expenditures between lobbying and non-lobbying activities, by relying
on total employee labor hours devoted to lobbying activities as a
stand-in for total investment in lobbying activities. If similar allocation
rules were adopted for campaign-intervention activities by 501(c)(3)
organizations, charities would be able to calculate how much of their
expenditures would have to be reimbursed by a non-501(c)(3)
affiliate, in effect - at least theoretically - nullifying the effect of the
deduction for contributions to the 501(c)(3). But this method is only
effective to the degree that employee labor hours are an adequate
substitute for actual expenditures.
The calculation would begin in the same way as the ad hoc salary
calculation described above"' - by calculating the total amount of
time spent by the minister in making the campaign-intervention
sermon. In the hypothetical presented above, we assumed that the
minister spent three hours in all. Under the ratio method, these three
hours would be added to hours spent by other paid employees. As for
volunteers, such as volunteer board members who may have been
involved in the decision of whether and whom to endorse, they would
presumably not fall under the category of "employees," and their time
would be ignored no matter how much they spent on campaign-
intervention activities. But once the ratio of employee hours was
determined (say, 3/2000), it would be applied not only to the
minister's salary, but to the total cost of operations, resulting in an
allocation for campaign-intervention purposes that would still be a
modest amount, but would be significantly more than the amount
calculated under the pure minister salary method. By applying the
de minimis exception, like the statutory $2,000 exception, reduces the degree to which
the calculation methods maximize the government's interest in expenditure equity.
For example, it would likely render sermon endorsement "free," since neither a
minister nor any other employee is likely to spend more than five percent of his or her
annual hours on whatever is necessary to prepare and make an endorsement. In
addition, a taxpayer may ignore time spent on campaign activities by secretarial,
clerical, support or other administrative personnel, so long as those hours are
removed from both the numerator and denominator of the ratio. See Treas. Reg. §
1.162-28(d)(3).
13 See supra note 110 and accompanying text.
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ratio method to the total costs of operation, some attempt would be
made to include "hidden" and capital costs in the allocation.
Therefore, as compared to the plain salary allocation performed
above,'35 the ratio method, for example, does a better job of estimating
the proper allocation. But an argument could be made that - even
ignoring the de minimis exception - these allocation rules arguably
fail to adequately provide a mechanism for estimating the portion of
the organization's funds that have been used to support the campaign-
intervention activities. That is because they rely on an allocation of
employees' time. If an organization's campaign-intervention activities
were somehow capital-intensive - that is, if they made use of an
organization's capital assets more than its employees' time - then
these rules would under-estimate the amount of the organization's
subsidy that was implicated in the campaign-intervention activity. As
discussed above, an argument could be made that the most important
"capital" asset of an organization making an endorsement is its
reputation or credibility. An organization may have spent a significant
amount of money over many years building the value of its credibility,
and, as discussed above, it may have used tax-deductible contributions
to do so. If the amount of time spent by employees fails to reflect the
years spent building an organization's credibility, then the ratio
method would arguably systematically undervalue campaign
intervention activities by the organization.
B. Allocation Using the Lump-Sum Safe Harbor Method
If the Service wanted to attempt to take into account expenditures
made for building an organization's credibility, it could promulgate
guidance that stated that such costs must be taken into account if an
organization wishes to endorse a candidate. It could then provide a
simplification method that an organization could adopt in attempting
to do so. Unfortunately, I have found no model for a simplifying
method that could do that completely successfully. Nonetheless, I
think that it is worth considering a largely arbitrary method that at
least attempts to account for the funds expended to build an
organization's credibility.
For example, in addition to providing simplifying safe-harbor
methods like the ratio method, the Service could issue guidance that
provided an alternative safe harbor that could be used if an
organization's campaign-intervention activities included a
135 Id.
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communication of the organization's own view about a candidate (an
express or implied endorsement). Under this safe harbor for
endorsements (which I call the "Lump-Sum Safe Harbor" method),
the Service could provide that it would treat as reasonable an
allocation of the organization's resources to campaign-intervention at
ten percent of the organization's total cost of operations (TCO).136
This largely arbitrary method for assessing the value of an
organization's brand as it relates to its endorsement could be used as a
supplement to a simplifying method like the ratio method. The ratio
method is expressed by the formula:
(campaign-intervention labor hours/total labor hours X TCO)
+ (3d Party costs) = Campaign Intervention Expenditures
The Lump Sum Safe Harbor method would simply add 10% of
total cost of operations to the sum produced under the ratio method,
so "campaign-intervention expenditures" for an organization that
made an endorsement using the following formula:
(campaign-intervention labor hours/total labor hours X TCO)
+ (3d Party costs) + (TCO X .1) = Campaign Intervention
Expenditures
It should be emphasized that the Service would make clear that
the ten percent lump sum estimation method is only a safe harbor, and
if the organization has a more accurate, reasonable method for
estimating the value of the organization's brand, then it could use that
method. However, the costs of choosing an unreasonable method are
dire: including both potential loss of exemption and imposition of
severe excise taxes under section 4955 of the Code."' Therefore, an
organization would be well served to either use the safe harbor or
seek a ruling from the Service approving its alternative method prior
to using it.
This article has presented two possible options for allocation safe
harbors. Both options could be crafted without de minimis safe-
harbors, making clear that the marginal cost theory is insufficient to
account for campaign-intervention activities and that a cost allocation
must include hard-to-identify (and potentially hidden) costs, such as
the cost of attracting members, the cost of a meeting space, and the
136 See Treas. Reg. 1.162-28(d)(4) (defining "total cost of operations").
137 See supra note 20.
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cost of supervising or training volunteers involved in the promulgating
of the message. Under the first approach, simplification methods that
are tied to employee time, like the ratio method, could be used to
approximate the value of such hidden costs. Under the second
approach, in the case of a communication that expresses a view of the
candidates that can be attributed to the organization (an
endorsement), the cost allocation would also have to involve some
additional measure of the organization's credibility.'
38
VII. IS THE LUMP SUM SAFE HARBOR JUSTIFIED?
Three compelling objections can be made to the Lump Sum Safe
Harbor. This article neither endorses the adoption of the Lump Sum
Safe Harbor nor opposes it. In the end, the Service should adopt some
expenditure method, and the 1.162-28 model is probably adequate.
But, if the Service were convinced that the 1.162-28 model
insufficiently advances the goals of expenditure equity, then it would
need to consider a solution like the Lump Sum Safe Harbor method.
Objections include, first, the argument that expenditure equity does
not demand that expenditures for "capital" investments, and
especially "credibility," be taken into account, and so the Lump Sum
Safe Harbor method actually distorts parity between taxpayers rather
than equalizing their respective situations; second, that the Lump Sum
Safe Harbor is just too arbitrary to solve any problem; and third, that
(partially because of the impossibility of developing a valuation
method to adequately take into account all of a charity's
expenditures) the constitutional analysis is flawed, and the Service's
current approach is constitutionally permissible.
A. The Lump-Sum Safe Harbor Method
Distorts Equitable Considerations
The first objection is that the Lump Sum Safe Harbor does not
advance the government's interest in expenditure equity or parity. As
discussed above, the concept of expenditure equity is based on the
idea that taxpayers should be treated as similarly as possible with
138 If an endorsement were made by a non-501(c)(3) organization, attribution
principles may apply to determine whether the value of the 501(c)(3) organization's
credibility should be implicated. So, for example, an endorsement by a non-501(c)(3)
organization affiliated with Nature Conservancy may include some of the value of the
Nature Conservancy's "brand," even if the communication is formally made by the
non-501(c)(3).
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respect their expenditures for campaign intervention. It was pointed
out above that individual taxpayers cannot deduct the costs of their
campaign-intervention activities. Similarly, under section 162(e),
taxpayers that are engaged in a trade or business cannot deduct the
costs of their campaign-intervention activities. Finally, nonprofits
devoted to political activities may not receive tax-deductible
contributions or use tax-free investment earnings for campaign
intervention. So - the argument goes - charities should not be able
to use tax-deductible contributions for their campaign-intervention
activities.
The problem with this "parity" argument is that the three types of
non-charity taxpayers are actually all treated slightly differently in
ways that are material to the applicability of the Lump Sum Safe
Harbor method.9 First, while it is true that individual taxpayers may
not deduct costs associated with campaign intervention, there is no
method by which their "credibility" is considered a cost for these
purposes. An individual taxpayer's endorsement of a candidate is
"free," no matter how "credible" that taxpayer is, or how he built his
credibility. If he is a minister of a 501(c)(3) church, and his credibility
was built with tax-deductible funds, it is the same as if he is a private
individual who built his credibility by purchasing advertisements
extolling his virtues. Likewise, if the individual taxpayer is famous or
has built her credibility through profit-seeking activities, her
endorsement is similarly free, even though the expenditures made
were probably deducted as ordinary and necessary business
expenditures. Oprah Winfrey may be a salient example. Her
endorsement is valuable in part because of the empire she has built
around her own personality, an empire built with "pretax" funds,
since they were likely incurred in the course of her business. The
taxpayer who is most likely to be at a disadvantage in this context is a
politician, who likely built his credibility using "post-tax" political
contributions, although an incumbent has also used his office to build
139 See, e.g., Buckles, Reply, supra note 9, at 1109 ("were parity in politics really
desired, sections 501(c)(3) entities that chose to expend funds to elect a candidate for
public office would need to compensate the government at most only for that portion
of the subsidy diverted to political ends"); and Galston, supra note 47, at 122-23
("Since [permitting 501(c)(3) organizations to create affiliated 527 organizations]
would have prevented money attributable to deductible charitable contributions from
being used to support 527 groups, Congress's failure to allow 501(c)[(3)] organizations
this option reveals that it must have been concerned with more than protecting the
public fisc. Based upon the legislative history of §527, it seems likely that the
exclusion for 501(c)(3) groups derives from the underlying policy objective to keep
charities themselves, and not just charities' money, out of political campaigns.").
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his credibility, again "for free." In this context, it is hard to see why
charitable organizations should be treated to more stringent rules than
individuals.
As for business taxpayers, we have already seen in 162(e), that
there is both a generous statutory safe harbor ($2,000 of non-third-
party expenditures) and an absence of any express method for
allocating expenditures for capital expenditures, much less
"credibility" or "brand," to deny the deduction for a proper allocative
share. Because there is no guidance in the area, it seems clear that
business entities are not required to allocate "overhead" expenditures
to campaign-intervention purposes to comply with the general denial
of deduction for such expenditures under 162(e)(1)(B). This article
has tried to avoid discussing the separate restrictions on expenditures
by corporations under campaign-finance law, which require
corporations to make certain campaign-intervention expenditures
through a "PAC," using funds contributed on a non-deductible basis
for that purpose.140 But the rules that define such expenditures permit
corporations to make all sorts of "overhead" expenditures for the
benefit of their PACs, even from their "treasury" funds. Presumably,
these expenditures are deductible under 162, since there is no
required method for allocating overhead under the 1.162 Regulations.
Finally, while political organizations may not receive tax-
deductible contributions, and may not use certain investment earnings
for campaign-intervention without paying a tax on them, they may use
certain limited tax-free earnings on campaign intervention (for
141
example, from bingo). More importantly, there is no guidance to
suggest that a 501(c)(4) organization that chooses to make its
campaign-intervention expenditures through a separate segregated
fund under section 527 may not make certain expenditures for
"overhead" outside of the fund. These expenditures could presumably
be made using investment income earned on a tax-free basis. There is
no hint anywhere that the Service would require such a taxpayer to
pay for the use of its "credibility" out of its separate segregated fund.
If there is no concept of "credibility" reimbursement anywhere
else in the Code, why should it appear only with regard to charities?
Why should expenditure equity treat charities worse than all other
taxpayers? The answer can only be that the government's interest in
140 See, generally, FECA, 2 U.S.C. §§ 431-57, specifically 2 U.S.C. § 441(b), 11
C.F.R. §114.1(a), FEC, CAMPAIGN GUIDE FOR CORPORATIONS AND LABOR
ORGANIZATIONS (2007).
141 See I.R.C. § 527(c)(3).
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expenditure equity does not need to result in exact parity between
taxpayers. But the argument for taking into account the cost of
building credibility, especially under a largely arbitrary method like
the Lump Sum Safe Harbor method, is undercut by an examination of
the treatment of endorsements by other taxpayers.
B. The Lump Sum Safe Harbor Method is Arbitrary
The second objection is that no theoretically sound method of
valuing an organization's credibility has been found. The Lump Sum
Safe Harbor method has two theoretical components: (1) the idea that
a fixed percentage of total expenditures is an adequate measure of the
subsidy received by an organization and (2) the idea that ten percent
is the correct percentage. The second idea is completely arbitrary.
There is no basis for choosing ten percent as the optimal fixed
percentage of total expenditures and I know of no basis by which a
theoretically defensible percentage could be selected.
As for the first claim, there is at least some justification. Since the
goal of expenditure equity is to isolate expenditures made with tax-
deductible funds, a measure such as total costs of operations does
some rough justice to identifying which organizations have received
more or less subsidy. For example, a church led by an unpaid preacher
that gathered members by word of mouth and met in a public field of
lilies would likely be able to engage in the most explicit kind of
campaign intervention ("that Caesar is bad news") without any need
to make use of an affiliate's non-deductible funds to pay for it. On the
other hand, a televised ministry with a highly paid minister may have a
significant amount of costs that would have to be shouldered by a
non-501(c)(3) if it decides to engage in campaign-intervention
activities. But this distinction between an all-volunteer organization
and an expensive one correctly tracks the competing interests served
by the Ban: to further expenditure equity while at the same time
permitting organizations to engage in protected speech. The idea that
organizations have spent an equal percentage of their funds on
building their credibility is reasonable, at least as a simplification
rubric.
C. If There is No Compelling Valuation Method,
Then The Service's Complete Ban is Constitutional
Finally, some critics may argue that the Service's current
approach is justified because the inadequacy of any proposed
expenditure method to truly provide parity between 501(c)(3)
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organizations and other taxpayers supports the Service's approach of
absolutely prohibiting 501(c)(3) organizations from engaging in
campaign intervention. That is, if the very existence of an attribution
of speech to a 501(c)(3) was found to involve an expenditure - and it
was simply impossible to adequately measure or reimburse that
expenditure - then that could conceivably justify an absolute ban on
campaign-intervention speech by 501(c)(3) organizations. In effect, if
the very possibility of a 501(c)(3) organization expressing its own
views would produce an opportunity for abuse of the general statutory
scheme surrounding campaign contributions, then some substantial
burden may be justified.
This argument has been made before. In his dissent in League of
Women Voters, Justice Rehnquist attacked the Court's application of
the affiliate organization solution, arguing that,
The Court seems to believe that Congress actually subsidizes
editorializing only if a station uses federal money specifically
to cover the expenses that the Court believes can be isolated
as editorializing expenses. But to me the Court's approach
ignores economic reality. [The Corporation for Public
Broadcasting's] unrestricted grants are used for salaries,
training, equipment, promotion, etc.-financial expenditures
which benefit all aspects of a station's programming,
including management's editorials. Given the impossibility of
compartmentalizing programming expenses in any meaningful
way, it seems clear to me that the only effective means for
preventing the use of public moneys to subsidize the airing of
management's views is for Congress to ban a subsidized
141
station from all on-the-air editorializing.
In other words, if the "economic reality" is that there is no
effective way to ensure that no government subsidy be used for the
prohibited activity, then (according to Justice Rehnquist at least) the
government can condition its funding on the organization agreeing not
to engage in the prohibited activity at all. Or, in the case of permitting
tax-deductible contributions, the government can condition the
receipt of such contributions on the organization agreeing to refrain
from engaging in campaign-intervention activities, even if the only
alternative means for engaging in such activity is substantially
burdensome.
142 FCC v. League of Women Voters, 468 U.S. 364, 406 (Rehnquist, J.,
dissenting) (emphasis added).
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The final arbiter of these arguments, of course, will be a court.
Scholars of the Constitution are in a much better position than I am to
evaluate the relative merits of the arguments from the perspective of
constitutional law. My goal in this article has been, rather, to explore
the implications of the constitutional argument by thinking through
the problems that would be faced by the Service if it (or Congress)
embraced an expenditure paradigm as a way to avoid the
constitutional problems. These problems are essentially accounting
problems.
VIII. CONCLUSION: WHY THE PROPOSED EXPENDITURE
PARADIGM Is GOOD POLICY
This article has argued that the problem with the Campaign
Intervention Ban arises from competing policy goals. On the one hand
is the constitutionally protected right of all persons - organizations
included - to engage in political speech, including the
communication of their views on the qualifications of candidates for
public office. Competing with this constitutional imperative is the
legitimate governmental interest in what I have called expenditure
equity - the desire to prevent the tax laws from providing a monetary
benefit to some persons over others in their attempts to communicate
their views about candidates. Without the Ban, the Code would
permit individuals to deduct their contributions to organizations that
then use those contributions to intervene in campaigns, thus creating a
loophole in a statutory scheme designed to ensure that all campaign-
intervention expenditures are made with "after-tax" dollars.
The problem with the current Service interpretation of the Ban -
the attribution paradigm - is that it places an undue burden on
certain organizations that wish to exercise their constitutionally
protected rights. But, as I have argued herein, the Service does not
have to pursue a constitutionally problematic enforcement strategy.141
A shift to an expenditure paradigm that successfully linked the
143 After forcefully arguing that the Ban is unconstitutional, Laura Chisolm asks,
"how can the constitutional dictates be reconciled with our instinctive feelings that
section 501(c)(3) organizations ought not to be involved in partisan politics?"
Chisohm, supra note 9, at 336-37. She answers: "The analysis that leads to the
conclusion that total curtailment of political expression is not necessary to accomplish
the legitimate purposes of tax exemption requires a careful exploration of
alternatives. From that process there emerges a picture of an alternative arrangement
that answers the constitutional objections; at the same time, we are reassured that
less-restrictive measures respond quite well to our legitimate concerns about the
purposes and integrity of the tax exemption." Id.
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subsidy provided under the Code to the prohibition contained in the
Ban would advance the legitimate government interest in expenditure
equity, without placing an undue burden on charities who want to
pursue constitutionally protected activities like lending their moral
and spiritual authority to the debate about candidates.144 This article
has explored the complications that arise, however, when one takes
seriously the attempt to fashion an expenditure paradigm. While
those complications are real, it is my view that adopting an
expenditure paradigm like the ones proposed herein - even with all
their problems - would be better policy than continuing to attempt to
enforce the Ban as it is currently interpreted by the Service.
First, adopting either of the proposals made herein would better
balance the government's interests: expenditure equity on the one
hand and free speech on the other. The current interpretation of the
Ban is most likely unconstitutional, and for good reason. The attempt
to silence charities (and especially churches) on a matter of such basic
importance as the qualification of candidates for office is abhorrent to
our constitutional scheme. The argument that the government has a
right to control speech when it provides subsidies can go only so far. It
cannot justify penalizing legitimate charities for communicating their
views on candidates with completely unsubsidized funds. On the other
hand, current proposals to permit the use of tax-deductible
contributions for campaign-intervention speech in effect create a
subsidy for such speech, potentially distorting the political process.
In addition to the primary goal of better balancing the
government's interests, the adoption of an expenditure paradigm like
the ones described herein has the benefit of being more theoretically
defensible than the Service's current approach. In other words, simply
by explaining the link between expenditures and the subsidy provided
by section 170 of the Code, the government improves its situation.
First, an enforcement paradigm that is theoretically justified is good in
itself. Almost twenty-five years ago, Robert Cover argued that when
144 It goes without saying that the restrictions that the government imposes on
itself in regulating speech do not apply to the decisions religious (and other)
communities make about their own pronouncements. I suspect that the majority of
churches (and other charities) would not use their "cultural capital" to intervene in
campaigns. The "moral authority" of many if not most of these organizations derives
- in part - from the fact that they do not use it to try to influence voters, and these
organizations would see a revolt of their members if they were to change that. But
most is not all. Some religious communities (and other organizations) are committed
to political agendas - even partisan political agendas - and they have a right under
the law to be so committed, so long as they do not use the subsidies provided under
the tax laws to advance their commitments.
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the government seeks to prevent communities from acting on their
core values, it should make explicit the normative bases that compel
the conflict. The fact that the law does more than persuade carries
with it an obligation on the part of the government to make
compelling the justifications for its laws. Thus, when the government
explains why its interpretations of its laws are theoretically justified, it
advances the goal of good governance.
In addition to being an end in itself, adopting an expenditure
paradigm and explaining it may well improve voluntary compliance by
charities. As Anne Carroll has pointed out, "the churches and their
leaders can respond to critics of their [campaign intervention] conduct
with powerful moral, theological, and historical arguments to which
the simplistic formulations of the federal tax authorities supply no
ready answers.', 46 The constitutional principles contained in the First
Amendment reflect an underlying normative framework, by which
people in communities (especially religious communities) may view
the attempts by the Service to utterly silence them on electoral issues
to be illegitimate. Once the Service withdraws its assault on political
speech by charities and replaces it with an attempt to force them to
provide an adequate accounting of the subsidy provided by the
government, charities may well be convinced that such an accounting
is legitimate and actually do it. The expenditure paradigm asks the
Service and 501(c)(3) organizations to think about how much their
campaign-intervention speech costs, so that charities may use funds
donated for such a purpose without the benefit of tax-deduction. Once
the topic has switched to a technical issue - cost - it seems unlikely
(or at least less likely) that a charity would view the government's
interest as conflicting with its core values. The government is not
saying to a charity, "be silent on such issues." It is merely saying, "sit
down and count the cost. 1 47 It is only logical that a charity would be
more likely to voluntarily comply with such a law.
Even if charities are not convinced that such an accounting is
legitimate, having a theoretically justifiable enforcement paradigm
may help the Service. Freed from its fear that the Ban is
unconstitutional or contrary to important values, the Service may be
able to enforce its new expenditure paradigm more aggressively. Thus,
it may better regulate the behavior than the current situation in which
145 Robert Cover, The Supreme Court, 1982 Term: Foreword: Nomos and
Narrative, 97 HARV. L. REV. 4 (1983).
146 Carroll, supra note 4, at 226.
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Enforcing the Campaign Intervention Ban
the Service promulgates an expansive enforcement paradigm, but
does not aggressively enforce it. As is apparent from the Service's
inconsistent enforcement of the law over the past several decades, a
solution that could advance the government's legitimate interests
while promoting compliance would be a significant improvement over
the current regulatory paradigm.
Finally, notification of the existence of a reimbursement for
campaign intervention could be required, either under campaign-
finance laws or under the tax code. There is nothing inconsistent with
expenditure equity or the Constitution in requiring expenditures for
campaign intervention to be disclosed in any number of ways. As
campaign-finance law has long recognized, disclosure is a powerful
tool in the protection of the integrity of the electoral system,
especially with the advent of the internet.
The majority of these benefits would arguably accrue whether the
Service adopted a relatively lax standard, such as one modeled on the
safe-harbor methods provided in 1.162-28, or a more stringent
standard, such as the Lump-Sum Safe Harbor method. The first
option is more easily defended as theoretically sound, which is, after
all, one of the most important goals of the proposed reform. But it
arguably undervalues campaign-intervention expenditures by a
501(c)(3) organization, and therefore arguably under-serves the
interests of expenditure equity. The second method has the strength
of attempting to take into account all relevant campaign-intervention
expenses. But it has the weakness of being premised on a theoretical
basis that is arguable at best, and on an implementation that is largely
arbitrary. Both methods in effect turn a liberty issue into a valuation
issue, and may thereby have the potential to build consensus either for
increased voluntary compliance or increased aggressive enforcement.
The proper role of charities - and especially churches - in politics is
a subject worthy of debate, of course. But the federal government,
especially as it acts through its revenue gathering agency, should limit
itself to considering how to avoid subsidizing such speech through the
Code.
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